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Corporate Governance and Employee Pensions
Thesis directed by Prof. Mattias Nilsson
Using a large panel data set, this paper studies the relationship between corporate governance
and defined benefit plan management in the United States. I show that poorly governed firms,
proxied by log of median director ownership and five other governance variables, are more likely to
sponsor defined benefits (DB) plans. Using a Heckman selection model I show that these poorly
governed firms have more pension assets and more pension liabilities on aggregate and on a per
employee basis, and they fund their defined benefit plans better. Poorly governed firms also tend to
assume higher rates of return on their pension assets, as well as higher discount rates on their future
pension obligations. Poorly governed firms are also more likely to sponsor DB plans that are funded
better than the median plan. These firms tend to operate in union-intense industries and usually
in more concentrated markets. Better governed firms, in turn, have more growth in their pension
assets and liabilities as a result of path dependencies. I further examine CEO characteristics related
to these firms and find that firms are more likely to sponsor defined benefit plans when their CEO
salaries are higher and the CEO total compensation is higher. The data also shows that lower
CEO ownership in the firm increases the likelihood of sponsoring a defined benefit pension plan, in
line with previous literature (Pagano and Volpin (2005)) showing CEOs with lower ownership and
rights on cash flows direct more cash towards employees. This evidence is in line with Bertrand and
Mullainathan’s (2003) Quiet Life argument, and shows that entrenched CEOs value non-pecuniary
benefits as theorized by Jensen and Meckling (1976) and supported empirically by Cronqvist et al
(2009).
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Chapter 1
Introduction
What firms sponsor defined benefit (DB) pension plans, and what are the determinants of
corporate DB pension policy? More importantly, what incentives, if any, drive CEOs of such firms
to manage, or mismanage, DB plans? Jensen and Meckling (1976) look at the agency problems
related to CEOs and state that these managers enjoy private benefits that are not necessarily
tangible; employee loyalty, better relationships with employees, less conflicts and e↵ort in wage
bargaining especially in union-intense industries, and other non-pecuniary benefits can arise from
paying workers more. Paying workers more than a competitive wage can have a positive impact
on morale and quality of e↵ort. However, Jensen and Meckling (1976) do not specify how workers
are paid and whether or not these payments are actually made or simply promised to employees.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) study entrenched managers and find that managers prefer to
live the “quiet life”, where managers would rather live peacefully than to empire build or get
into conflicts with unions. Cronqvist, Heyman, Nilsson, Svaleryd and Vlachos (2009) use Swedish
data and find that entrenched managers do pay their workers more and enjoy these non-pecuniary
benefits mentioned in Jensen and Meckling (1976). In this paper, I show that entrenched CEOs
in the United States also pay their employees more, albeit in future terms, to enjoy the same
non-pecuniary benefits mentioned in Jensen and Meckling (1976).
For a comparable study one would like to work with all workers’ wages in the United States,
similar to data obtained from Scandinavian countries. Many papers use plant-level data in the
United States to study factors that a↵ect plant worker wages as another way to argue di↵erent
2topics. While both aforementioned methods yield strong results in their respective fields, I study
the factors that a↵ect another form of employee pay - future promises made to employees in the
form of defined benefit pensions. Data availability is always a problem, and I try to circumvent this
issue by merging several databases relating to financial data, labor data, CEO and Board data, and
finally pension plan databases to look at the relationship between CEO entrenchment - measured by
several governance indices - and rank-and-file employees defined benefit pension plans. Governance
indices are also tricky to use since no one index is perfect, and most of the indices have many flaws.
I used the log of the median director’s ownership as per Bhagat and Bolton (2008) as my main
measure since it is an intuitive measure that does not require assumptions in terms of weighing
di↵erent variables. To my knowledge, this paper is the first to look at managerial entrenchment
and employees’ DB plan management. The pension literature generally covers firms’ investment
and other decisions when sponsoring pension plans, and also look at pension plans as “inside debt”
for CEO compensation.
Defined benefit plans are promises made to employees to receive certain compensation after
retirement based on an equation that lumps together employees salary, employee tenure and future
growth rate of current salary depending on employees age. These promises are liabilities that the
firm incurs, and as such the firm pledges assets and makes contributions to cover those liabilities.
The DB plan is considered “funded” (unfunded) if the pension assets are greater (lower) than the
pension liabilities. Watson Wyatt estimates that in 2006 the aggregate value of DB pension assets
of U.S. corporations was $2.2 trillion, a rather large amount that has a relatively lower exposure
to research in the finance literature.
I look at all publicly traded firms in the Compustat universe from 1998 to 2006 and combine
it with other databases to include director/board data, union data, and pension data. I restrict
my sample to all firms that have at least one of my six governance measures. More than half of all
the firms in my final dataset have sponsored a DB plan. In order to correct for endogeneity in the
choice of sponsoring a DB plan, I use a Heckman self-selection model to first answer the question on
the determinants of corporate DB pension plan policy; I find that poorly governed firms are more
3likely to sponsor DB plans. This result is robust to di↵erent measures of governance and is not
sensitive to the di↵erent indices used. This result leads us to the second question on CEO incentives
to sponsor and manage such DB plans; in line with the previously mentioned papers, I find that
entrenched CEOs pay their workers better, albeit in future terms, to enjoy private non-pecuniary
benefits. Entrenched CEOs have larger pension liabilities and accompany that with larger pension
assets. As such, these entrenched CEOs have a better funding status on their DB plans - poorly
governed firms have a better funding status than better governed firms. Managerial opportunism is
also evident in the volatility of a firm’s DB plan funded status, showing that these poorly governed
firms have larger volatilities associated with their funded status, as well as assuming higher rates of
return on their pension assets and discounting their future pension benefit obligations more. Path
dependency seems to dictate the growth in pension assets and liabilities, and as a result I find that
better governed firms have larger growth in their respective pension assets and liabilities.
Employee satisfaction is another essential aspect of Jensen and Meckling’s non-pecuniary
benefits. Using Edmans (2011) data on employee satisfaction based on Fortune Magazine’s “100
Best Companies To Work For in America”, I find strong positive correlation between my governance
measures and Edmans (2011) best companies (BC) measure, and it is not surprising that the BC
results are very similar to the better governed firms results. BC firms are less likely to sponsor DB
plans, have lower levels of pension plan assets and liabilities and have more growth in their pension
assets and liabilities presumably attributed to path dependencies in the data. What is interesting
in these BC results is that the pension assets and liabilities per employee are higher for these BC
firms, suggesting that conditional on sponsoring a DB plan the firm has more assets per employee
set aside to cover the larger liabilities promised to the employees.
I also look at how tax benefits a↵ect both the likelihood of sponsoring a DB plan and the
management of these plans. Theory suggests that firms would take advantage of the tax deductions
should they have higher marginal tax rates. As such, I find that firms that have higher marginal
tax rates are more likely to sponsor a DB plan. Higher marginal tax rates are also significantly and
positively related to funded status and the level of pension assets per employee.
4The data also shows that these firms with better funded pension plans operate in more
unionized industries. One can conclude from the data that CEOs do not want to have conflicts
with these unions and as such fund their DB plans better, which in turn leads to happier employees
and better relationships between managers and employees. The “quiet life” argument also dictates
higher market concentrations and assumes relatively high barriers to entry, and the evidence in this
paper shows that higher market concentration within an industry not only increases the likelihood
of sponsoring a DB plan but also shows better funding of the DB plans, higher levels of DB plan
assets and liabilities on aggregate and on a per employee basis. These results suggests the evidence
is in line with Bertrand and Mullainathan’s (2003) “quiet life” theme.
In order to get a better grasp of CEO incentives, I also look at CEO compensation structures
and find that CEO ownership is negatively related to the likelihood of sponsoring a DB plan - the
lower the CEO ownership in the firm, the more likely the firm would sponsor a DB plan. This
result is in the same vein as Pagano and Volpin’s (2005) result showing lower managerial ownership
is related to increased employee wages. The evidence in this paper also shows that CEOs in firms
with DB plans tend to have higher salaries (guaranteed portion of compensation). I also find that
in these firms, the guaranteed portion of compensation is positively related to the level of DB
plan fundedness. The value of CEOs holdings in the firm are also positively related to fundedness,
but total CEO compensation is negatively related to DB plan fundedness - the lower the total
compensation, the higher the fundedness. Throughout all the CEO analyses and specifications,
the governance e↵ects were still strong and significant. The CEO analysis follows in the quiet life
theme: entrenched managers that fund their plans better are older and have a higher percentage of
guaranteed pay in the form of salary in the compensation package, suggesting managers may have
more control over their compensation package and are happy with the status quo and not looking
to empire building schemes or expansion plans.
My analysis contributes to several strands in the finance literature. First, in terms of the
pension literature, to my knowledge these results are the first to document the relationship be-
tween corporate governance, CEO characteristics and DB plan management. Previous studies have
5looked at the e↵ects of pension on capital structure (Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2010)), or how
pension contributions a↵ect levels of corporate investment (Rauh (2006a)). Other studies have
documented relationships between pension contributions and tax benefits, or have looked at an
investors perspective on a firm’s pension funds.
This paper also contributes to the literature on managerial control of o↵-balance-sheet items.
Many papers in this branch of finance look at the tax implications and benefits of o↵-balance-sheet
items and how they are a↵ected by corporate tax considerations. Previous studies have looked
at pensions (Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2010)) and leases (Graham et al (1998)) as examples of
o↵-balance-sheet items and found significant results on uses of such items. Pension plans are an
o↵-balance-sheet item, and this paper shows that entrenched managers have rather large discretion
over how these plans are managed, especially if they are geared towards a manager’s private benefits.
Finally, these results also add to literature on managerial benefits of control. Many studies
have documented managers’ benefiting from social relationships and other non-pecuniary benefits
starting with Jensen and Meckling (1976) and more recently empirically shown in Cronqvist et al
(2009). The results presented in this paper also build on Bertrand and Mullainathan’s (2003) quiet
life story, and corroborates their claims on managerial quiet-life preferences.
The paper is organized as follows. Chapter II explains the theory behind pension plans and
gives background information on the literature surrounding pensions. Chapter III discusses the
theory behind corporate governance, managerial entrenchment, and private benefits. Chapter IV
describes the data. Chapter V describes the construction of my empirical model, the results as well
as robustness checks. Chapter VI concludes.
Chapter 2
Pensions
There are several research papers that conduct studies on how governance a↵ects worker pay.
Cronqvist et al (2009) use Scandinavian worker data to show how di↵erent governed firms pay their
workers. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003), as well as others, look at plant-level data and study
the di↵erent governance e↵ects on wages. I will look at a close alternative: defined benefit pension
plans. Although it is not a perfect substitute to worker wages, I believe it will certainly give us some
insight as to how managers in the US promise to compensate their workers. The future “promises”
to pay employees in the future is in itself an interesting avenue to explore given di↵erent types of
managers and di↵erent levels of managerial discretion. In the employees point of view, they would
be more relaxed and less prone to revolt against their manager if their future promises seem likely
to be fulfilled. From a managers point of view, the level of pension fundedness does not include
any money exchanging hands between the firm and the employees today, and as such a manager
may or may not be inclined to manage their pension funds as well as other managers.
While there are many papers related to pension funds, it is surprising how few actually study
the relationship between corporate governance/managerial entrenchment and defined benefits (DB)
pension funds’ management. Most of the literature studies the e↵ect of DB plans on a firm’s tax
status, underfunded DB plans on corporate activity, and also on pensions as inside debt instruments
as part of CEO compensation. There are many technical papers that explain the technical and
accounting di↵erences between balance sheet entries and what firms can and cannot record, but
7once again to my knowledge nothing relating to managerial entrenchment exists.
There are several types of pension plans in use today, the two most common of which are the
defined benefit (DB) plan and the defined contribution (DC) plan. A DC plan is similar to a 401k
account, where employers, employees, or both parties, make certain contributions into an account
on behalf of employees that accumulates investment returns throughout the employee’s tenure at
the firm. The employer’s only responsibility is this specified contribution with a known obligation
and cost, and all the investment risk is borne by the employee. A DB plan is di↵erent in the sense
that it promises an employee a certain amount of benefits upon retirement, based on a formula with
three main inputs: the employees age, tenure and salary. To the extent that this benefit formula
gives an unknown result at an unknown cost to the employer, all the investment risk is borne by
the employer. Di↵erences between the two types of plans lie inherently in the risk borne by each
party involved.
2.1 Public and Private Pension Plans
Private pension funds should not be confused with public pension funds. Private pensions are
pension funds sponsored by corporations in the private sector, while public pensions are sponsored
by public entities such as governments and/or municipalities. This study deals with private pensions
only, but public pensions warrant some discussion.
Why do these plans even exists in the first place? Lazear (1986) posits that these plans have
to be beneficial for either the employer, the employee, or both. He states that these plans act
as implicit contracts between an employer and an employee that alters incentives for long term
employment with less turnover1, and employers may o↵er these long term incentives to encourage
more e↵ort from employees in the workplace. He also states that less turnover leads to lower costs
in training, and more induced e↵ort leads to higher productivity and more profits to be shared with
the employee. He calls this an “e ciency wage”; you can’t monitor all employees, so this e ciency
1Mitchell (1982) finds that having a pension reduces probability of leaving a job by 10%
8wage can deter shirking by an employee since the employee would lose his/her job if found shirking
and can give up his pensions before qualifying for them.
Just as underfunding pension plans may a↵ect some corporate activities in the private sector,
the fear of under spending on essential public service is tied to underfunding these public pension
plans. These obligations on the public sector are substantially large since a great majority of public
workers have access to DB plans. The Bureau of Labor Statistics shows that 92% of unionized public
sector employees and 65% of non-unionized workers have access to some sort of DB plan and/or
retiree health benefit plans. In terms of private sector plans, 88% of unionized private industry
workers have access to a DB plan and/or retiree health benefits, and 62% of non-unionized workers
have access to these plans.2
These pension obligations are liabilities on private sector firms and also liabilities for the
public sector. There is no disagreement whatsoever over how and why these public plans are
underfunded. There is, however, a large debate over how to value the liabilities associated to these
public plans. The Government Accounting Standards Board approves the use of the expected
rates of return of plan assets as the liabilities discount rate, yet there is no rigorous theoretical
foundation to prove that this is the right method. As such, policy makers, plan administrators and
plan actuaries use this method approved by the GASB. To put it into perspective, Brown, Clark
and Rauh (2011) show that these public plans use a discount rate between 7-9%, as opposed to
the 4% that is related to municipal bond yields that many people suggest should be used as the
appropriate discount rate. Novy-Marx and Rauh (2010) look at the underfunding of public plans
and find a total underfunding of $3.2 trillion using municipal bond rates and treasury rates as
discount rates. Munnell et al (2011) look at 126 public plans and use GASB accounting rules and
still find a funding ratio of 78% and $800 billion in aggregate underfunding.
In terms of benefits to employees, the public pension plans are much more generous than
private plans. Brown, Clark and Rauh (2011) show that public pension plans pay higher benefits
2In terms of public sector employees, only Alaska, Michigan, Nebraska and Utah o↵er something other than DB
plans to new employees
9per year of service, and also encourage younger retirement due to the way these plans are designed.
They show that plan design and characteristics are extremely important in influencing worker
decisions, and since nearly all public sector employees are covered by a DB plan that entitles them
to generous benefits upon retirement, it discourages turnover and encourages early retirement. As
a result, they cost more to fund. Retiree health plans are o↵ered in nearly all states and local
governments, which is not necessarily the case for private sector employees. The costs of these
retiree health plans are soaring in both the public and private sector, according to Brown, Clark
and Rauh (2011).
The trouble with public pensions is that some plans are tied to constitutional non-impairment
clauses by several states, meaning that these obligations cannot be reduced under law.3 Promising
higher future pay in these states runs the risk of not being able to reduce them, if need be, in the
future when facing funding trouble. Schieber (2011) says that increasing benefits in good times
without taking into account constraints against lowering them during bad times is a recipe for
disaster, which is what got these plans to this underfunded state.
So how should one fund these plans? Black (1989) and Bodie (1990) suggest using a bond
portfolio with a similar duration to that of a plan’s lifetime in order to shield them from interest
rate fluctuations. Lucas and Zeldes (2006) suggest that these plans should be funded with equity
since these accrued liabilities are a function of wage growth, and stocks and wages are correlated
over long time horizons. Pennacchi and Rastad (2011) favor more risk in portfolios to back these
plans, since a more risky portfolio may be beneficial for taxpayers if they lack access to risky
investments and could provide risk exposure for them. They also state that, however, if these
pension funds run surpluses and that surplus is shared with employees, then taxpayers may not
benefit from this added risk. There is no clear consensus on how these plans should be funded,
but there is an agreement that most of the assets should be in terms of fixed income securities.
Pennacchi and Rastad (2011) look at the composition of these plans and find that less than 25%
3Illinois has such a law. They cannot reduce these liabilities for current employees. They have reduced the
benefits for newly hired employees as a result
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of a typical portfolio is in terms of fixed income securities, with the rest being invested in riskier
holdings. Given that nearly three quarters of pension assets were directed towards equity and such
risky assets, one would not be totally surprised about their decline after the recent credit crisis in
2008. To sum up this argument, it is clear that insu cient contributions, excessive benefit increases
during good times, poor asset allocation and poor asset-liability risk management all led to these
public plans ending up with this large amount of unfunded obligations.
The remainder of this paper will discuss private pension plans and how they are a↵ected by
di↵erent corporate actions.
2.2 Trends in Converting to Defined Contribution Plans
As mentioned above, DC plans are di↵erent than DB plans in terms of who bears the risks
associated with investment returns on the pension assets. Recall that a DC plan is similar to a
401k account where either employers, employees, or both parties, make a specified contribution
in a timely manner into an account on behalf of employees that accumulates investment returns
throughout the employee’s tenure at the firm. As a result, the employee bears all the investment
risk associated with the account.
In terms of converting to DC plans, Schieber (2011) shows a trend in the private sector to
o↵ering DC plans as opposed to DB plans. More specifically, he finds that in “1975 DB participants
were 27.2 million and DC participants were 11.2 million, representing 48% and 18% of the workforce
respectively. In 2004, DB plans dropped to 20.6 million, and DC rose to 52.2 million, 19% and
48% respectively”. Another paper by Perun and Valenti (2008) shows that while 70% of active
employees participated in a DB plan in 1975, over 75% of active employees in 2005 participated in
a DC plan instead. They also find that participation in DC plans increased over 48% between 1995
and 2005. Studies attribute this shift towards DC plans to increasing costs to employers, as well as
complex rules and regulations that must be followed when sponsoring a DB plan. Another major
reason for the conversion is said to be the unpredictable cash contributions to the plans because of
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volatility of pension asset investment returns. As mentioned above, the firm bears all investment
risks associated with these pension assets based on their respective allocations and investment
strategies.
This conversion to DCs is not only a supply side issue, but a demand side issue as well.
Rauh and Stefanescu (2009) mention that on the demand side employees are searching for more
flexibility and more control over their own retirement accounts, similar to 401(k)s, especially since
technological innovations increased employee turnover, which makes retirement accounts’ mobility
that much more valuable. Newer generations of workers may not be interested in promises of
distant benefits at 65 years of age, and pension plan mobility becomes a necessity. Perun and
Valenti (2008) use data provided by the PBGC and state that there is a trend in the decline of DB
plans, and a large decline associated with non-unionized DB plan participants. These declines are
mostly a result of DB plan conversions by smaller firms with plans that cover 250-999 employees.
They also find that larger DB plans with 5,000 and more participants continue to exits and grow
though time.
Several articles and technical papers have predicted this trend to DC to increase especially
after the passage of the Pension Protection Act in 2006. The Act increased DB plan disclosure and
reporting rules, making the DB plans more transparent to participants, and researchers predict
that firms would convert to DC plans post 2006 because of these new rules.4 Munnell and Soto
(2007) look at the British pension system after they adopted more transparent disclosures on DB
plans and found the percentage of assets frozen or terminated doubled after the passage of those
laws.
Perun and Valenti (2008) state that “after 30 years of gradual decline, DB plan providers are
slowly, but steadily, acting to freeze or terminate their plans”. It is probable that the long-term
e↵ects of these conversions from DB to DC plans will not be seen for decades, but the causes of
these conversions are clear and relatively comprehensible, as explained above.
4Unfortunately my dataset covers years up to 2006. This is definitely a fertile area for future research.
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2.3 Defined Benefit Pension Plan Portability
Portability of pensions is relatively important to American workers, especially since Hall
(1984) states that Americans typically hold 10 or 11 jobs during their working lives. As such, it is
important for participants in DB plans to know what happens during job loss or job transition.
But how portable are these pension plans really? Portability is less of an issue in DC plans
since they are very similar to 401(k) accounts, where an account is set up and contributions are
made in a timely manner and accumulates investment returns. Even if employees switch firms,
similar contributions made to the account and similar investment rates of returns would provide
them with the same benefits upon retirement. As such, these DC plans are assumed to be portable.
Since DB plan benefits are calculated using a formula that takes into account years of service
and final/average salary, benefits will not be the same if employees switch jobs. Vested employees
that leave their jobs before retirement would have their final/average salary used at that time,
which would be less than that at retirement, multiplied by the number of years of service, which
again is less than that at retirement. As such, the total benefits received would be lower.
There are some portability provisions that exist covering DB plans. Some provisions cover the
accumulated assets, and others involve credited service by the employee.5 However, these portability
provisions are rarely available to single-employer pension plans. There are some “multi employer”
plans that exist in highly mobile and unionized industries such as trucking and transportation that
collectively manage their plans, and employees moving from one employer to the other do not get
penalized when it comes to determining their benefits.
However, Foster (1994) states that “few DB benefit plans are available with portability pro-
visions”, and as such I will assume that no portability exists in DB plans for the purpose of my
econometric model. Recall also that theory states DB plans encourage and incentivize longer
5Some provisions cover assets that can be withdrawn as a lump sum, and credited service provisions allow the
new employer to account for years of service at the previous employer in determining pension benefits
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tenures for employees at the firm, and as such portability may be at odds with the ultimate goal
of providing DB pension plans.
2.4 Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation6
ERISA, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, was passed in 1975 to set up a
regulatory framework to make these pension plans more secure. ERISA set up the PBGC to
partially insure participants from losing all their pensions if their firm goes through a period of
financial distress. It is said that ERISA was passed in order to avoid another Studebaker-Packard,
where nearly 11,000 employees lost their jobs in 1963 after the Studebaker-Packard Corporation
went under and closed their plant. The employees were surprised that they also lost all their
pensions - 85-100% of their accrued benefits went down with the firm as well. Wooton (2001)
states that “no single event is more closely associated with ERISA than the shutdown of the
Studebaker plant in South Bend, Indiana”.
To see how the PBGC works, Bethlehem Steel declared bankruptcy in 2001, and had funded
only 45% of their employees pension benefits. The PBGC announced they would cover 92% of the
$7.8 billion accrued to employees, and as a result the employees were only exposed to an 8% loss.
The PBGC takes over a firm’s pension plan in two ways: (1) either it takes over the plan in
an involuntary termination, or (2) the firm files for distress termination, usually during bankruptcy.
Involuntary termination usually happens when the PBGC proves that the possible long term loss to
the PBGC can be expected to increase if the pension plan is not terminated. Distress termination
usually happen when a firm can prove that they cannot pay o↵ their debts and cannot continue
in business unless the pension plan is eliminated. The follow sections will describe the rules and
regulation in more detail.
6Most of this section is a summary of Je↵rey Brown’s (2007) “Guaranteed Trouble: The Economic E↵ects of the
Pension Benefit Guarantee Corporation” for NBER. For further details please see http://www.nber.org/papers/
w13438
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How is the PBGC financed? Every private pension plan pays premiums to the PBGC, similar
to insurance premiums, set by the United States Congress. The PBGC also acquires assets from
terminated plans, collects investment returns and also bankruptcy recoveries. It is essential to
point out that no tax revenues are directed towards the PBGC.7 These premiums were initially set
at $1 per participant in 1974. By 2006, Congress increased the premiums to $30, and in 2007 it
was linked to wage inflation. Underfunded plans pay 0.9% of the unfunded vested benefits to the
PBGC. It is worth noting that premiums are the same and do not account for risk - underfunded
plans pay the same premiums as funded plans per participant.
The financial status of the PBGC is of great importance. As of 2000, the PBGC had a surplus
of roughly $23 billion. As of 2006, the PBGC had a deficit of $18.9 trillion, largely attributable to
the post tech boom bankruptcies.8 As Brown (2007) states, “why is the agency that was supposed
to provide retirement security turning into the main source of retirement insecurity?”.
The crisis in 2000 acted as a “double whammy” for pension assets - large reduction in asset
values decreasing the pension assets, and fall in interest rates increasing pension liabilities. The
main question here should be “why were these pension plans exposed to such risks in the first
place?” Why was there no regulation by the PBGC, the entity insuring pension participants future
payments, to limit such activities by pension plans? The PBGC had no regulation (pre 2006) to
stop severely underfunded plan sponsors from increasing their benefits to participants even more,
nor did it charge these firms higher premiums to do so. As mentioned previously the premiums
are the same for every firm and not based on a firm’s credit worthiness or rating, and since the
premiums are set by Congress the PBGC has no authority to increase them autonomously. Boyce
and Ippolito (2002) propose a model in which private insurers would be responsible for these pension
7That was an initial worry upon establishing the PBGC since taxpayers thought they would be liable for any
private pension plan underfunding. ERISA made sure this was not an issue, however there still is an implicit guarantee
(not dissimilar from a Too-Big-To-Fail story) from Congress to use taxpayer money to bailout PBGC if it comes to
that.
880% of all PBGC payouts occurred after 2000 with UAL, TWA, US Airways, Delta Pilot Plans, Polaroid,
National Steel and others filing for bankruptcy
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obligations and found that these private entities would charge at least double the premiums for
the same type of insurance.9 While the goal of the PBGC seems noble, the way they have been
managing their policies seems like a catastrophe to both pension participants and/or taxpayers. 10
Brown (2007) lists some faults that can be attributed to the PBGC, a couple of which were the
failure to properly price insurance premiums to discourage excessive risk taking by plan managers
and the failure to promote adequate funding of obligations. If the PBGC wasn’t allowed to punish
these firms then the market should, in theory, be able to do the job. However, another fault from
the PBGC was the failure to promote su cient pension status disclosure to the market. The PBGC
did not have the authority to disclose pension status information to plan participants prior to 2006,
even though the PBGC had all the necessary information. Prior to the Pension Protection Act in
2006, the firm was the only entity that had the authority to disclose that information through their
Form 5500 filings which weren’t necessarily filed at the end of the fiscal year. While the Pension
Protection Act of 2006 gave the PBGC some authority in releasing pension plan information, it
was confined to pension plan participants and beneficiaries. The act, however, “did not change
the timeliness of information to market participants nor did it allow the detailed information of
underfunded plans to be public” as per Brown (2007). The 2006 act did not address two major
sources of managerial management of pension liabilities, and managers are still able to use actuarial
liabilities instead of market valuations, and can also still use (or abuse) the interest rate smoothing
techniques available to them.
Having this safety net provided by the government and sponsored by the PBGC that operates
based on mandates from Congress decreased the employers’ incentives to adequately fund their
pension plans. When asked about the PBGC safety net for managers, Professor Norman Stein
from Drexel University stated that “the moral hazard is real” but ERISA has enacted rules to
9Lewis and Pennacchi (1999) and VenDerHei (1990) say market based premiums would be even higher, around 4
to 6 times the current premiums.
10Ippolito (2004) argues that as plans are getting more and more underfunded there is an increased likelihood that
taxpayers would be called upon to bail them out
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mitigate this issue which are discussed in later sections.11 There are arguments from many scholars
to eliminate the PBGC altogether. As per Brown (2007), “while serving as chief economist for
the PBGC, Ippolito (1987) wrote that one approach to solving the PBGC’s problems would be to
simply eliminate the PBGC”. Bodie (1996) states “economic reasoning establishes a rationale for
insuring defined-benefit pensions against the risk that the plan sponsor will default on its promise
to provide benefits. It does not establish a rationale for the government to provide such insurance”.
Other scholars argue that if private insurers take over the job of the PBGC some firms might go
bankrupt just from the premiums they might expect to pay to private insurers. Wilcox (2006) takes
a middle-of-the-road approach and argues that Congress should enact reforms to the PBGC first
and then think of other alternatives later.
2.5 Pension Plan Terminations/Freezes
Not all plans end up going to the PBGC. Aside from the “distress termination” explained in
the previous section, ERISA also allows companies that deem their DB plans too costly to undergo
a “standard termination” or a “freeze” of their DB plans. Conversions to other types of plans is
also allowed by ERISA.
Standard terminations, as mandated by ERISA, state that the pension plan must pay all
benefits accrued up to the date of termination to the plan participants. The plan therefore must be
fully funded in order to use this method, by definition. Plan sponsors would use the pension plan
assets to purchase a su cient group annuity from an insurance company, or pay out lump sums
to plan participants. Plan participants do not face any issues with vesting, and they all become
fully vested in their accrued benefits. As such, the main di↵erence between standard and distress
terminations is the funded status of the plan.
ERISA allows allows firms to freeze their DB pension plans. The di↵erence between freezing
and terminating a DB plan is that the firm continues to operate the plan as a regular DB plan
11Professor Norman Stein is a nationally recognized authority on pension law, employee benefits and tax law.
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except that the benefit accruals are “frozen” for some, or all, the plan participants. The firm is not
required to pay out all the benefits accrued to employees immediately following a freeze, whereas all
benefits must be paid out in lump sums or annuities in plan terminations. Firms can choose a “soft
freeze”, where they choose not to allow new entrants into the DB plan and only keep their current
benefit-accruing participants, or they can go with a “hard freeze” where all the participants stop
accruing benefits based on their future wages and service either immediately or at a future date.
The freeze at a future date serves to soften the blow of the freeze typically for older employees.
For example, if a five-year delayed freeze is implemented, participants aged 60 would reach at 65
and have their benefits fully vested. A “hard freeze” is typically the first step towards DB plan
termination. The Center for Retirement Research at Boston College suggest that these freezes
occur before termination in order for employers to “buy additional time” before accounting for the
termination expenses.
Rauh and Stefanescu (2009) compare firms that freeze their plans with firms that don’t, and
they find the firms that froze their DB plans have significantly higher market leverage than other
firms. They also find these firms have lower market to book ratios than non-freeze firms, which
suggests they have trouble with the valuation of their growth opportunities. They also find that
freeze firms are worse o↵ servicing their debt than non-freeze firms. In terms of pension benefit
obligations to employees, they find that firms that freeze have, on average, a higher present value
of future benefits than their competitors. The authors state that “freezes appear to be a way for
financially weak firms to limit their liabilities that are due to expected future wage increases by
employees”.
As discussed above, ERISA has o↵ered firms several di↵erent methods in managing their DB
plans. The next sections will discuss how managers choose to manage their employees’ private DB
plans.
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2.6 Defined Benefit Pension Plan and Bankruptcy
Several studies highlighted the di↵erences between the goals of ERISA in protecting employee
retirement benefits, and the provisions of Chapter 11 of the bankruptcy code which allows the
reorganization or rejection of burdensome contracts.12
Bankruptcy does not automatically terminate any DB plans a firm has sponsored; as de-
scribed above, the firm has to file for distress termination following a bankruptcy should they want
to terminate their plans. A fully funded plan, for example, can weather the storm of bankruptcy
and emerge unscathed if neither party seeks to terminate the plan and let the PBGC takeover
during the bankruptcy proceedings.
The usual cases in bankruptcy, however, deal with distress or involuntary termination of a
DB plan. Involuntary termination generally would be initiated by the PBGC if they determine
that the long term loss to the PBGC would increase substantially if the plan is not terminated.13
The plan sponsor, however, would terminate using the distress termination provisions, in which the
courts usually rely on one of the necessary distress criteria “the debtor cannot pay debts when due
and cannot continue in business unless the pension plan is terminated”.14
12More details on each step of bankruptcy and pension proceedings can be found in Lewis and Melwani (2006)
13ERISA states the 4 reasons the PBGC would file for an involuntary termination of the plan as “(1) the plan
sponsor has not the plan sponsor has not made its required minimum funding contributions to the plan; (2) the plan
does not have su cient funds to pay benefits when due, (3) there has been a distribution to a substantial owner under
section 4043(b)(7) of ERISA,12 or (4) possible long-term loss to the PBGC can reasonably be expected to increase
unreasonably if the pension plan is not terminated.”
14ERISA states that for distress termination rule 4041(c) of ERISA:14 “(a) the plan administrator must provide
60-days advance notice of its intent to terminate to the a↵ected parties (i.e., to plan participants and union represen-
tatives); (b) the plan administrator must provide the necessary data and information required by section 4041(c) of
ERISA to the PBGC; and (c) the PBGC must determine that the “necessary distress criteria” exist. There are four
di↵erent types of “necessary distress criteria” under which a party may qualify in order to terminate a pension plan:
(i) a liquidation in bankruptcy or insolvency proceedings; (ii) a reorganization in bankruptcy wherein the bankruptcy
court has determined that the plan termination is essential to the confirmation of a successful plan of reorganization;
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In terms of seniority of PBGC’s claims on the pension assets during bankruptcy, the issue
is slightly more complex. Should a sponsor miss its minimum funding contribution (exceeding
$1million) to the DB plan before filing for bankruptcy, ERISA mandates that a lien is created on
the pension assets in favor of the PBGC, which converts the PBGC status to a secured creditor.
If the plan is terminated, the PBGC automatically has a lien on all the pension assets and for the
total unfunded benefit liabilities of the plan. If the sponsor, however, misses the minimum funding
contribution during bankruptcy or terminates the plan altogether, which is typically the case as per
Lewis and Melwani (2006), no lien can be created.15 The PBGC would not be a secured creditor
unless they had obtained an unavoidable lien prior to the plan sponsor’s bankruptcy. Generally,
the PBGC’s claim on the unfunded benefits and minimum funding contributions would be treated
as “non-priority general unsecured claims”. The sponsor does, however, still pay PBGC insurance
premiums yearly until the PBGC becomes the trustee of the pension plan.
2.7 Private Defined Benefit Pension Plans
Pension accounting is a delicate field that deals with large sums of money, and because of size
of these funds the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) issued several rules to regulate
the management of such funds. FAS No. 87, “Employer’s Accounting for Pensions” was rolled
out in 1985 to regulate the recognition of pension costs/expenses and how assets and liabilities
would be accounted for in financial statements.16 FASB faced significant backlash from Corporate
America prior to rolling out FAS No. 87, and accepted defeat in including compromises to please
(iii) the debtor cannot pay debts when due and cannot continue in business unless the pension plan is terminated,
or (iv) costs of maintaining the plan have become unreasonably burdensome due solely to a declining workforce.
15Lewis and Melwani (2006) also state that “if a lien is perfected within 90 days prior to the bankruptcy filing,
the debtor may have the ability to avoid such a lien as a preferential transfer under section 547 of the Bankruptcy
Code.”
16As per Zion and Carache (2002), the rules associated with FAS 87 were “convoluted, complicated, misleading,
and for many it just doesn’t make sense.”
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these firms.17
The liability associated with any DB pension plan reflects the present value of all future
payments due to its employees. As mentioned above, these future payments are the result of an
equation that depends on employees’ age, tenure, and salary. On the assets side, the firm has
pension assets managed in the interest of the employees specifically to fund these liabilities. The
firms, in theory, are supposed to make contributions to the fund so that the pension assets cover the
liabilities completely and record this contributions as a pension expense, but because of reported
operating income smoothing these contributions themselves follow certain smoothing mechanisms.
US law requires firms to make these contributions.18 If the market value of the assets in larger
than present value of the liabilities, then the plan is overfunded and no more contributions need
to be made. 19 Should the liabilities exceed the assets, the plan is said to be underfunded and is
required by law to make contributions to the fund.20
There are incentives for the firm to fund their sponsored pension plan, as Clifton et al (2003)
show that credit rating agencies may take these unfunded liabilities into account, which may in
turn raise a firm’s cost of capital via low credit ratings. Other incentives are straight out of pocket
costs such as insurance premiums to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).21 As per
17Zion and Carache (2002) state 3 compromises in undertaken by FASB after pressure from Corporate America:
1) Removing initial pension asset/liability from balance sheet and amortizing/expensing it over time, 2) Amortize
prior service costs and remove them from balance sheet, and 3) Reporting expected returns on plan assets as opposed
to actual returns, and only recognize the di↵erence between expected and actual when di↵erence grows larger than
10% of pension liabilities or assets, whichever is larger
18The pension contributions, whether made in cash, stock, or debt, are tax deductible, but the pension expense
recorded on the income statement is not. Of course tax rules set a limit to the amount of contributions that are
deductible per year.
19Voluntary contributions can be made up to a certain extent, after which firms lose the favorable tax status of
these contributions.
20The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 stipulates that underfunded plan sponsors must
make annual contributions equal to the present value of the pension benefits accrued during the year plus a fraction
of the funding shortfall. This unfunded liability is usually amortized for a period of 5-30 years.
21As per the PBGC’s website, they are a “federal agency created by ERISA to protect pension benefits in private-
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Rauh (2006), overfunded firms are exempt from variable PBGC premiums.22
In order to smooth annual reporting for firms from yearly fluctuations in market value of the
pension assets, FASB introduced an assumed rate of return on this pension assets fund as opposed
to using the realized return on the fund. This rate is adjusted at the fund manager’s discretion
and follows some lax guidelines regarding such changes. Managers have the responsibility of setting
the assumed rate of returns on plan assets, while pension plan actuaries have the responsibility of
setting the discount rates for pension liabilities, which are usually reviewed by external auditors as
well. Its is worth noting that expected rates of return on plan assets do not a↵ect funded status
of a pension plan, since pension assets are measured typically at fair value/market value. They do
a↵ect, however, pension costs/expenses as reported on an income statement. The discount rates,
however, do a↵ect funded status directly since they are used to value the pension plan projected
obligations.
The SEC in 1993 made clear that the discount rates used should be closely related to “high
quality corporate debt yields” in order to avoid rate assumptions that were not reflective of market
yields. Zion and Carache (2002) show that the these discount rates do follow closely Moodys Aa
corporate bond yield, with the largest deviation from that never exceeding than 55 basis points for
firms in the S&P 500.23 As per Bergstresser, Desai and Rauh (2006), managers have significantly
more leeway over setting their assumed rates of return on the plan assets than do the actuaries
in setting their discount rates. These discount rates assumptions still have some flexibility, how-
ever, and a Businessweek Magazine article states that “companies are not willing to change their
projections substantially because they do not want to create earnings volatility, and external audi-
sector defined benefit plans. If a plan ends without su cient money to pay all benefits, PBGC’s insurance program
will pay the benefit provided by the pension plan up to the limits set by law”.
22PBGC set these premiums at $19 per employee per year, plus $9 per $1000 shortfall as per Rauh (2006)
23Some firms do have discount rates di↵erent than what the SEC requires because of older employee workforce
(lower discount rates), or international pension plans that mimic di↵erent countries corporate bond yields. SEC
recommends using a rate close to that of two highest yields given by a recognized rating agency, and plan sponsors
tend to go for Aa bonds since they are at the higher ends of the range.
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tors aren’t challenging them”.24 The article goes on to say some “estimates are overly optimistic,
and suspect that auditors too often turn a blind eye”. Moreover, these smoothing mechanisms
introduced in FAS No. 87, which were initially intended to reduce earnings volatility, led to finan-
cial statements that can be classified as misleading because of the interest rates manipulation by
managers, as per Zion and Carache (2002).
Bergstresser, Desai and Rauh (2006) also look at how managers manipulate these rates of
return to inflate their reported earnings and also capitalize on these changes. They find significant
evidence on managerial manipulation, and find that managers use “higher assumed rates of return
when they prepare to acquire other firms, when they are near critical earnings thresholds and when
their managers exercise stock options”. As an example of how these changes a↵ect a firm’s bottom
line, they find that nearly 5% of IBM’s pretax income in 2000 and 2001 was a result of the 50
basis point increase in the assumed rate of return on pension assets in 2000.25 Rauh (2006) also
looks at how the pension contributions a↵ect investment policy, and finds that capital expenditures
decline with increasing mandatory contributions to DB plans, with the e↵ect more evident in firms
that have lower credit ratings and face financial constraints. With more and more managerial
manipulation and mismanagement of such pension plans that ultimately limit value-enhancing
corporate activities, firms end up either switching DB plans to defined contribution (DC) plans
or freeze/terminate their DB plans totally. Rauh and Stefanescu (2009) state that should a firm
switch to a DC plan due to the deteriorating financial health of the sponsor the “total benefits do
not immediately decline as contributions to DC plans increase immediately”. They do find firms
that freeze their plans “experience significant reductions in the liabilities of the DB plans”. Of
course, all of the aforementioned papers study the e↵ects of mismanagement and manipulation on
private DB plans and not state sponsored plans. 26
24Businessweek article “Pumped Up Pensions” published on October 24th, 2004
25IBM, coincidentally, changed that assumed rate of return, which is assumed to be a long-term measure, four
times between 1991 and 2002.
26State sponsored DB plans follow di↵erent rules and guidelines. Novy-Marx and Rauh (2010) look at the present
value of public pensions liabilities as of 2009 and find that value to be $3.2 trillion. These plans are subject to
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To put this managerial manipulation into perspective, Zion and Carache (2002) estimate the
real earnings associated with pension income and the reported smoothed earnings. They estimate
that, in 2001, S&P 500 firms transformed $90 billion loss on pension assets into a $104 billion
income. In terms of rates of return, they find that the median expected rate of return used in these
firms in 2001 was 9.20%, and they stipulate that the realized return associated with these pension
funds were, in actuality, a loss of 7.50%. 27
The DB plan underfundedness is shown to a↵ect corporate activities in M&A activities as
well. Shleifer and Summers (1988) theorized that hostile takeovers transfer pension plan related
wealth from workers to shareholders and violating implicit labor contracts. In a more technical
paper by Kumar (2006) that studies the impact of pension plan funding and M&A activity, he
shows that poor funding status of target firms decreases the likelihood of the firm being acquired.
Ponti↵, Shleifer, and Weisbach (1990) study takeover gains and find that pension plan reversions
after takeovers, in some cases, explain a significant portion of takeover premium. They find that
pension plan reversions in takeovers account for nearly 13% of the takeover premium. Bhagat et al
(1990) look specifically at hostile takeovers and find that pension plan terminations post-takeover
are a significant source of gains but are unlikely to be the main motive behind the acquisition.
Bowers and Moore (1995) show that there is a positive relationship between excess pension assets
and target firm and combined firms abnormal returns, consistent with the argument that excess
pension assets act as financial slack that investors re-value in acquisitions.
One might argue whether or not investors fully process such mismanagement and under-
fundedness of a firm’s pension liabilities, especially since past accounting research has shown that
information complexity and presentation can a↵ect analysts’ information gathering process (Plum-
lee 2003). Bulow, Morck, and Summers (1987) find that stock market valuations reasonably reflect
firms pension funding situations, and show that managers are better o↵ funding their plans since
they also find no support that investors ignore pension liabilities when valuing firms. Coronado and
di↵erent laws, especially when it comes to plan termination/freezes.
27Their research paper is aptly titled “The Magic of Pension Accounting”.
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Sharpe (2003) and Franzoni and Marin (2006) show that underfundedness in itself is not su cient
for investors to fully understand pension plan’s impacts on future earnings. Carroll and Neihaus
(1998) showed that the levels of pension plan assets and liabilities are important and may a↵ect a
firm’s value similar to regular assets and liabilities. More recently Picconi (2006) also shows that
neither investors nor analysts fully incorporate the e↵ects of such information when it is reported,
but do incorporate it after they observe the e↵ects in subsequent quarterly earnings. Zion and
Carache (2002) state that “investors are concerned about the increase in cash contributions that
the companies would have to make to their pension plan if their funded status continues to de-
cline”. This is also apparent in the accounting industry where FASB released a revised version of
SFAS 132 in December 2003 (and revised it again in 2008) stating new rules in pension disclosures
to “provide information that would better serve the users of financial statements’ needs”. These
amendments only addressed disclosure rules and not the measurement/recognition of pension and
post-retirement benefits.28
It is evident from the literature that firms do have significant discretion over how their DB
pension plans are managed. However, to my knowledge, there has not been a paper that discusses
the relationship between managerial entrenchment and corporate pension policy. It is, therefore,
interesting to see whether and/or how a manager uses these pension funds to benefit not only from
pecuniary returns (as documented above) but also from the intangible aspects, and whether or not
a manager truly seeks to live a quiet life.
28In 1985, FASB issued SFAS 87 which stated that fair values of both the pension assets and liabilities be disclosed
in the financial statement footnotes. The 1998 introduction of SFAS 132 was aimed at addressing investors/analysts
concerns regarding the rate of return on pension plan assets, the employer’s funded status, and also estimating
the impact of pension cost on net income. The 2008 revision required “more detailed disclosure, including further
disaggregation of asset categories and improved qualitative discussion about risk exposures in the asset portfolio.
Chapter 3
Agency Theory and Corporate Governance
3.1 Agency Theory
Jensen and Meckling (1976) look at the agency problem surrounding a manager not only
from “the benefits he derives from pecuniary returns but also the utility generated by various
non-pecuniary aspects of his entrepreneurial activities” including personal relations with employees
such as “love, respect, etc..”. As such, it is important to realize that some managers value good
relations with employees and also value their employees’ loyalty. Good relations with employees can
be achieved through higher wages, better health benefits, or, in our case, better managed pension
funds.
Cronqvist et al (2009) use Swedish employee data and show that “CEOs with more control
pay their workers more”, and that CEOs “pay more to employees geographically closer to the
headquarters, and associated with conflict-inclined unions”. This result suggests that entrenched
managers pay their employees more to enjoy certain private benefits, such as better relations with
employees. The fact that they pay more employees associated with conflict-inclined unions proves
all the more that managers enjoy benefits of lower e↵ort in wage bargaining and want to avoid
conflicts, a result not dissimilar from Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) “The Quiet Life” result.
The Bureau of Labor Statistics state “unionized private sector employees are substantially more
likely than their non-unionized counterparts to have access to DB plans as well as retiree health
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insurance”.29 Higher wages lead to more loyalty and respect; this follows exactly what Jensen
and Meckling (1976) call “non-pecuniary” benefits, and opens up the way to look at other ways
managers derive such benefits. Their paper was one of the first papers that empirically showed the
existence of such benefits and document their economic importance.
Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) also look at managerial entrenchment in the form of
insulation from takeovers through state adoption of anti-takeover laws using US firm and plant level
data. They show that when managers are insulated from such threats “worker wages (especially
those of white-collar workers) rise”. They also show that destruction of old plants fall, but so does
the creation of new plants, resulting in an insignificant change in firm size. This result, contrary
to previous results relating entrenched CEOs with empire building, shows that CEOs actually seek
to enjoy the “quiet life”. They hypothesize that higher wages and lower e↵ort in wage bargaining
with employees may be a way for managers “to buy peace with their workers”.
Higher wages can be another form of takeover insulation. Pagano and Volpin (2005) show
that if a manager has high private benefits with low ownership in the firm, managers and workers
can be allies against takeovers. They show that this can be done though long-term labor contracts
with higher wages directed towards the employees. Workers will try to protect their wages, and as
such will resist takeover threats and become natural allies to managers. While this may be true
with employee labor contracts, managers can terminate defined benefit pension funds and convert
them to other types of plans (this will be explained in the following sections). Relating Pagano
and Volpin’s (2005) paper with the theory behind this study might lead to di↵erent conclusions.
Nevertheless, their results stand with regular wages and long term labor contracts and is an im-
portant result in this growing field. Pagano and Volpin (2005) also look at managerial cash flow
rights and employee wages, and find a negative relationship between managerial equity stake and
wages. This result is of great relevance to my research, and it is interesting to see how managers
promise to pay their employees in future pensions relative to their ownership stake in the firm.
While the above mentioned literature shows that managers search for the quiet life, it is
29National Compensation Survey 2010
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conceivable that managers would not look to pay their employees well just for the love and respect
relationship. One can easily see a manager looking to have a better relationship with shareholders
by directing a firm’s returns to them and minimally fund the employees pension funds. After all it
is the shareholders that have the biggest say in matters relating to the firm and especially regarding
board composition, which in turn appoint the managers at the firm. A manager can also choose
to direct returns towards increasing stock price which in return makes the shareholders, the board,
and even himself happy. In other words, there are enough incentives for a manager not to overpay
his employees relative to other firms in the industry.
All the previous papers support in one way or another Jensen and Meckling’s claims on
managers benefiting from non-pecuniary benefits. This paper will try to add to that growing
literature by studying how di↵erently governed firms manage their rank-and-file employees’ pension
funds.
3.2 Corporate Governance
Endogeneity concerns plague any study on corporate governance. It is very di cult to argue
any issue and assume causality solely on better or worse governance within firms since there are
many unobservable risk dimensions that might be interfering with your model. As shown in Bhagat
and Bolton (2008), previous papers stated a causal relationship between governance and future firm
performance such as Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (GIM 2003), and Bebchuk, Cohen and Ferrell
(BCF 2004), but later the relationship was proven to be inaccurate due to the endogenous nature
of governance and/or due to sample period specificity, the latter shown in Core, Guay and Rusticus
(2005). As per Bhagat and Bolton (2008), it is clear that one needs to account for endogeneity in
models that incorporate governance, and they propose a series of simultaneous equations to adjust
for that.
Another pitfall is the actual governance measure used. GIM (2003) constructed a measure
(which I will call the G-Index henceforth) compiled from the Investor Responsibility Research
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Center (IRRC) that assigns scores based on shareholder rights-decreasing provisions; the more the
provisions, the larger the measure corresponding to weaker shareholder rights. The G-Index is an
equally-weighted index of 24 corporate governance provisions compiled by the IRRC.
Several papers challenged the equal weighting of each provision, arguing that some provisions
matter more than others and some might actually be correlated with each other. As such, BCF
(2004) constructed an “entrenchment index” (E-index, henceforth), and they identify 6 provisions
within the G-Index’s 24 that they hypothesize play an important role in the governance-firm per-
formance relationship. The E-Index is comprised of 4 shareholder power-limiting provisions and 2
hostile takeover-impeding provisions: staggered boards, limits to shareholder bylaw amendments,
poison pills, golden parachutes, and supermajority requirements for mergers and charter amend-
ments. Similar to the G-Index, the higher the score (from 0-6) on the firm’s E-Index, the more
entrenched a manager is considered to be.
The aforementioned indices are constantly used in the corporate governance literature even
with their deficiencies. Other papers argue that simpler measures of governance were needed that
did not entail the ad hoc nature of assuming di↵erent weights for di↵erent shareholder/merger
provisions. The weighting assumption in itself opens up a debate on why and how each provision
was weighted, whether equally weighted indices or otherwise. Other simpler governance indices
were proposed in Bhagat and Bolton (2008), such as the dollar ownership of board members. They
argue that this measure is “simple, intuitive, less prone to measurement error, and not subject to
the problem of weighting a multitude of governance provisions in constructing a governance index”.
They discuss the positive implications of such a measure since boards have the final say in all major
decisions relating to the firm including governance itself. Appropriate board ownership can give the
director an incentive to vigorously and e↵ectively monitor important decisions in the corporation.
While it is the manager’s fiduciary duty to solely manage the DB pension plans in the interest
of the beneficiaries30, one can easily find agency problems and provide anecdotal evidence on how
managers can, and might, manipulate these funds for their own personal benefits. So how would
30Corporate executives are usually the trustees on these DB plans
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good governance a↵ect pension plan management? Taking into consideration all the stakeholders
of a firm one can argue based on e ciency wage theory, and other research supporting the notion
that pensions induce more e↵ort from employees and help with employee monitoring, that o↵ering
pension plans would be the right decision and might lead to increasing profits through increased
e↵ort and productivity. One can also argue, conversely, that directing more funds to employees and
less to shareholders can generate many benefits solely to managers and create agency problems.
Sponsoring a DB plan means the firm pledges to contribute funds towards funding the future
liabilities promised to the employees over and above their salary and other compensation, which
o↵sets what shareholders would receive had there not been any DB plans for employees in the first
place. Table 1 provides a summary of the advantages and disadvantages of sponsoring a DB plan
the main stakeholders involved.
Although not much has been covered on corporate governance and pension policy, a recent
article by Phan and Hedge (2012) shows that better governed firms typically allocate more of
pension assets in risky securities, suggesting that shareholders would prefer the DB plan fund
itself via equity returns and not through cash contributions by the firm. Anantharaman and Lee
(2014) show that these allocations are related to CEO compensation, and they find evidence that
risk-shifting (underfund pension plans and allocate more assets into riskier securities) is positively
related to managerial compensation structures that create higher wealth-risk sensitivity (option
vega). They also show the e↵ect is stronger for firms in financial distress.
In this paper I will use dollar ownership of board members, as proposed in Bhagat and
Bolton (2008), as my main proxy for corporate governance to see how entrenched managers use
their employees’ DB pension plans for their own personal benefits. I will also use the G-Index, the
E-Index, CEO/Chair duality, and a measure of board independence to further analyze the findings.
Other governance measures, such as outside blockholders, will be used to check the robustness of
the results but will not be part of the main analysis because of the lack of enough data.
Chapter 4
Data
4.1 Data Sources and Definition of Variables
To my knowledge this is the first paper that merges together agency theory, corporate gover-
nance and pension plan management. As such, this paper draws on many di↵erent data sources to
compile a unique dataset that is able to capture the e↵ects of corporate governance and managerial
entrenchment on defined benefit pension plan management. The following sections will describe the
dataset and state their sources, and Appendix A has a complete set of definitions for all variables
used in this study.
4.1.1 Governance Measures
As mentioned above, I use 6 di↵erent governance measures in this paper. The director
ownership (LogMedOwner) data was obtained from RiskMetrics Directors database (formerly
know as the IRRC Takeover Defense database), with the data ranging from 1998 to 2006. The
G   Index was obtained from the RiskMetrics Governance database with the data ranging from
1998 to 2006. The E  Index data was obtained from Lucian Bebchuck’s website, and it too covers
the years 1998-2006. Independent director (PercentIndep) data was obtained from RiskMetrics as
well, and covers the years 1998-2006. CEO   ChairDuality is also another governance variable
used in the analysis and the data ranges from 1998-2006. Outside blockholder (SumOut) data was
obtained from WRDS database, and the data ranges from 1998-2001.
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Since LogMedOwner is a governance measure that was introduced by Bhagat and Bolton
(2008) and is used in my analysis, I will use the Bhagat and Bolton (2008) governance dataset that
has 5 of the 6 governance measures (outside blockholder data excluded) in order to have a better
comparison with the results produced in their paper. Their dataset ranges between 1998-2006. All
data was winsorized at the 1% level.
4.1.2 CEO and Directors Characteristics and Compensation
Data on CEO characteristics (age, tenure etc...) and compensation (salary, bonus, shares
owned, etc...) were obtained from Compustat’s Executive Compensation database. The data cov-
ers the years 1998-2006. More specifically, I use the database to compute several di↵erent CEO
compensation variables such as the market value of the shares owned by the CEO (LogCEOShares)
and the percent of the total compensation that is guaranteed (%Salary), among other variables.
Director characteristics (inside director, outside director, linked, etc..) and their respective com-
pensation were obtained from Risk Metrics Database and the data covers the years 1998-2006. All
data was winsorized at the 1% level.
4.1.3 Pension and Financial Data
Firm specific data, such as pension data and financial information, were obtained from Com-
pustat. I use Compustat’s financial database to compute several firm specific variables in my
analysis to control for firm age (FirmAge), leverage (Leverage), firm size and growth (LogSale
and SalesGrowth), as well as the growth opportunities available(TobinsQ). I also use firm prof-
itability (ROA) in my analysis, as well as firm gross and profit margins to control for market
concentration (IndGM and IndPM).31
31These market concentration measures are widely assumed to be superior to other measures such as the Herfindahl-
Hirschman (HHI) Index obtained from Compustat and from the US Census data. Compustat HHI only covers public
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Compustat provides aggregate annual data on pensions (total pension assets, total pension
liabilities, etc...) and does not provide details on each specific pension fund within a firm. All
data was winsorized at the 1% level. Using this aggregate data ranging from 1998 to 2006, I
then compute the di↵erent measures related to pension plan management such as the funding
status of the pension plan and its volatility (FundedStatus and FundedStatusV olatility); the
levels of pension plan assets and liabilities (LogPenAssets and LogPenLiabs); the pension asset
and liabilities levels on a per employee basis (LogPaPerEmp and LogP lPerEmp); the respective
yearly growth in the aggregate pension asset and liabilities ( LogPen and  LogPenLiabs). I also
compute several other variables to study firms with pension asset rates of returns set above the
sample median (ExcessROR) and assumed discount rates on their future pension obligations set
below the sample median (LowDisc). I also look compute a variables that separate firms funding
their pension plans better than the median firm (WellFunded).
4.1.4 Firm Output and Employee Productivity
Lazear (1986) posits that pension plans increase employee productivity within a firm, thereby
increasing output.. As such, I use output and productivity datasets that were obtained from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data files. The BLS files include output and productivity
measures on an industry basis. Total industry output (LogOutput) as well as output scaled by the
number of employees (LogProdPerEmp) and output scaled by the number of hours of labor input
(LogProdPerHour) as well as labor share (LogLaborShare) were computed using the BLS data
files.
firms and does not take into account more prominent private firms within industries, and while the US Census HHI
might account for private firms, it only contains information on manufacturing firms. HHI also assumes an exogenous
industry structure, and as per Lunn (2014) “the exogenous nature of the classification neglects strategic threats of
potential entrants that might cause concentrated industries to behave in a highly competitive manner”.
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4.1.5 Union Membership Data and Employee Tenure
Union membership and coverage data were obtained from www.unionstats.com, a database
constructed by Barry T. Hirsch and David A. Macpherson (Hirsch and Macpherson (2003)). As per
their website, the database “is an Internet data resource providing private and public sector labor
union membership, coverage, and density estimates compiled from the Current Population Survey
(CPS), a monthly household survey, using BLS methods”. I used their union membership data by
industry starting from 1998 to 2006. I use both the percent membership in unions (PerMem) and
their percent covered by unions (PerCov) variables listed on their website.
I also obtained average employee tenure per industry (Tenure) using the Bureau of Labor
Statistics (BLS) data center. The data ranges from 2002 to 2006. All data was winsorized at the
1% level.
4.1.6 Best Companies List
Fortune Magazine’s “100 Best Companies To Work For in America” list was obtained from
Alex Edmans’ personal website. 32 Fortune Magazine publishes a yearly list of the “100 best
companies to work for in America” since 1998 till the present day. The list was first published by
Levering, Moskowitz, and Katz (1984), updated in Levering and Moskowitz (1993) and published
yearly by Fortune magazine since 1998. As per Edmans (2010), “two-thirds of the score comes
from employee responses to a 57-question survey created by the Great Places to Work Institute in
San Francisco. The survey covers topics such as attitudes towards management, job satisfaction,
fairness and camaraderie. The remaining one-third comes from the Institute‘s evaluation of factors
such as a company‘s demographic makeup, pay and benefits programs, and culture.” As such,
Edmans‘ employee satisfaction variable (BC) will be my main measure of employee satisfaction.
32Alex Edmans at London Business School http://faculty.london.edu/aedmans/
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4.1.7 Marginal Tax Rates
Theory suggests tax rates play a large role in pension plan management since pension plan
contributions are tax deductible. As such, I use marginal tax rate data obtained from John Gra-
ham’s personal website.33 The data follows his simulated data as explained in Graham and Mills
(2007) and covers the years 1998-2006. Based on his description, I use the tax rates after deductions
for depreciation, interest, and leasing expenses (MTR).34
4.2 Summary Statistics
The data consists of 2,647 firms over a range of 8 years, from 1998 - 2006 depending on
data availability. Of these firms, 1,354 have sponsored a DB plan for some period of time in
the dataset (some of them sponsored and froze plans, others did not have any DB plans and
subsequently sponsored some). As stated previously firms may have several DB plans on their
books and manage them in di↵erent ways, but this dataset does not look at single DB plans
since, unfortunately, Compustat only records aggregate data on pensions. The sample universe is
restricted to firms that have at least one of the 6 governance measures used in the analysis.
Panels A, B, and C in Table 2 show the summary statistics for the data - panel A shows
the summary statistics for pension data, panel B shows summary statistics for financial data, and
panel C shows summary statistics for the governance measures used in this study. Tables 3 and 4
separate the data into firms that sponsor a DB plan and firms that do not, respectively, and gives
the summary statistics of each group. In terms of firm-year observations, the sample has 23,382
observations. In terms of firm characteristics, panel B suggests that firms that sponsor DB plans
are usually larger, more profitable, more levered, older firms with lower growth. Panel C suggests
that firms sponsoring DB plans usually have less governance as measured by all the indices, and
33John Graham at Duke University Fuqua School of Business https://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/~jgraham/
34I also used the simulated tax rates before these deductions and find similar results
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t-tests show the di↵erences in the means for these variables are di↵erent from 0.
Figures 1 through 9 look at the pension data more closely. Figures 1, 2, 3 and 4 show the
overall average and median pension assets and liabilities of the firms in our dataset per year. As
is clear in the figures, firms on average had more pension assets than liabilities which meant the
pension plans were funded quite well initially, most probably with help from the tech boom in the
90s. As time goes on, it is clear that the liabilities were growing faster than the assets and as such
there is a dip in pension assets after the tech bubble crash and the downturn in the economy post
9/11. This decline in pension assets stems from the fact that most of the these pension funds were
stacked with equity as opposed to fixed-income securities or cash equivalents. Studying the data
further, figures 5 and 6 show the median pension assets and liabilities scaled by the number of
employees and, as expected, it follows the same pattern as the previous figures; pension assets per
employee exceeded pension liabilities in the 90s, and the tech bubble crash and post 9/11 downturn
caused liabilities to surge ahead while assets took a rather large hit. Figures 7 and 8 show the
average and median funded status of the firms in the dataset, and the dip in assets corresponds to
a large decrease in funded status of the firms; before the crash the average/median pension plans
were totally funded, and post crash the average/median pension plans were unfunded.35 Figure
9 looks at the assumed discount rates used by firms in the dataset compared to the Moody’s Aa
long term bond yields, and it is clear that they do follow the same trend throughout the years as
recommended by the SEC and shown in Zion and Carache (2002) and Brown, Clark and Rauh
(2011). The figure also shows that while the data follows the trend there is some positive deviation
from the exact bond yield, as expected.
One interesting fact from the data comes from the governance variables. I test how the
governance variables are correlated, if at all, with each other and find surprising results in Table
5. All the governance indices move together except the PercentIndep governance variable. As can
be seen in Table 5, the PercentIndep variable is negatively correlated with all the other variables.
35The red line in figures 7 and 8 corresponds to a plan being just funded since our fundedness measure is
PenAssets/PenLiabs.
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This result was surprising at first, but upon further examination of the issue I found that this
negative correlation was in line with Bhagat and Bolton (2008), the original people that compiled
this governance dataset. It is my assumption that while firms may concentrate their e↵orts on
having good corporate governance procedures they may not over-reach when it comes to di↵erent
procedures. In other words, firms with higher percentages of independent directors may feel they
do not need to increase the median ownership of these directors, nor do they need the oversight of
an outside blockholder, and feel they have a su cient level of corporate governance based on their
point of view. This “How Much Governance is Enough?” is in itself another topic to discuss and
study in a separate research paper altogether.
Chapter 5
Methodology and Results
In this section, I will examine the relationship between a firm’s corporate governance and
their DB pension plan management. As mentioned above, not all firms have DB plans for their
employees; firms may have other types of plans such as a defined contribution, a cash balance plan,
and other variations of such plans. As such, it is essential to realize that a firm chooses whether or
not to sponsor a DB plan for their employees; in other words a firm self-selects into it’s preferred
choice. This choice leads us to use a Heckman model to correct for this self-selection.
Peni,t = ↵0 + ↵1Govi,t 1 + ↵2Xi,t 1 + ↵3Zi,t 1 + ✏ (5.1)
Yi,t =  0 +  1Govi,t 1 +  2X2,i,t 1 + ⌘ (5.2)
where Pen is an indicator variable of whether or not a firm sponsors a DB plan, and
Yi,t represents the di↵erent dependent variables depicting pension management (FundedStatus,
Log PenAssets, etc...) that I will be examining. The error terms, ✏ and ⌘, are assumed to follow
a bivariate normal distribution. Since the net benefit of sponsoring a DB plan is unobservable, I will
assume that a firm chooses to sponsor a DB plan when the net benefit is positive, and conversely
chooses not to sponsor a DB plan when the net benefit is negative. As such, Pen equals 1 if the
firm sponsors a DB plan, and 0 if it doesn’t.
Equation (1) corrects for self selection in the 1st stage of the Heckman model via a probit
regression; Gov is a measure of the firm’s governance and I will be using 6 di↵erent variables to
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measure governance in a firm, X is a vector of independent variables used in both stages, and Z
is a vector of identification variables used in the selection equation only. Equation (2) then follows
the model in the 2nd stage and examines the e↵ect of governance on DB plan management.
With such a model dealing with selectivity issues, one always tries to eliminate endogeneity
concerns via a strong instrumental variable. The vector Z in Equation (1), for identification
purposes, requires an instrument that is associated with a firm’s decision to sponsor a DB plan,
but not directly correlated with any of the DB plan management variables. It should be stated
that it is not essential to have an instrument in the first stage of a Heckman self-selection model
since the first stage estimation is non-linear. It is also di cult to rely solely on the non-linearity
of the first stage for identification purposes since the inverse Mills ratio is relatively linear in some
parts of its domain. So in order to avoid a possible multi-collinearity problem in the second stage,
vector Z will include LogProdPerEmp, the log of the productivity per employee in firms within
the same two-digit SIC industry. E ciency wage theory has shown that pensions may increase
employee productivity that would probably lead to increased profits and larger firm output. As
such, employee productivity would definitely be related to the existence of a DB plan, but it would
not necessarily directly a↵ect how a firm manages such a plan in terms of funding status and other
corporate pension policies. LogProd (industry productivity), LogOutput (industry output), and
LogLaborShare (industry labor share) will also be used as instruments in robustness checks since
they too follow follow e ciency wage theory and would a↵ect the existence of a DB plan but not
necessarily a↵ect corporate pension policy. Other weaker instruments such as MeanDBSIC2yr,
the average number of firms sponsoring a DB plan in the same two-digit SIC industry classification
excluding the firm itself, will also be used as well.35 Since both stages involve pension related
dependent variables, it is extremely di cult to find an instrument that is completely exogenous.
Also, since these instruments act to add an additional layer of identification over and above the
non-linearity of the probit model used in Equation (1), any doubts surrounding the validity of the
35The average number of firms in the same industry sponsoring a plan should a↵ect a firm‘s decision to sponsor a
DB plan and not the way a firm might manage such a plan.
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instruments should be allayed.
The vector X contains all the independent variables used in both equations. It includes
a control for firm size, LogSales; SalesGrowth controls for the concurrent growth rate of the
firm; TobinsQ, a common proxy for firms growth opportunities; Permem controls for the e↵ect of
unions in pension management; Leverage controls for a firms long term debt scaled by assets as per
Shivdasani and Stefanescu (2009); MarketReturn controls for the time trend in the data and uses
the value weighted yearly return on the S&P 500 index; ROA measures the firms performance;
LogFirmAge controls for a firm’s age; MTR controls for a firm’s marginal tax rate; BC acts
as a proxy for employee satisfaction; IndPM and IndGM control for industry competition and
market concentration; and Gov is our main measure and it measures a firm’s governance using the
governance measures listed above.
5.1 1st Stage - Pension Choice
Table 6 shows the result of the pension choice probit regression. In terms of firm charac-
teristics, larger firms (proxied by sales), older firms, firms with lower growth opportunities, and
more levered firms are more likely to sponsor a DB plan. In terms of unionization, the data follows
theory in the sense that firms in more unionized industries are more likely to sponsor a DB plan.
Theory suggests that tax benefits play a large role in pension policy, and I find that firms with
higher marginal tax rates are more likely to sponsor DB plans. E ciency wage theory suggests that
pensions increase productivity, and I do find a positive relationship between employee productivity
and existence of DB plans in Table 6. The data also shows that companies listed in Fortune Mag-
azine’s “100 Best Companies to Work for in America” list are less likely to sponsor DB plans, and
I also find that lower product market competition within a firm’s industry increases the likelihood
of sponsoring a DB plan.
What is interesting here is the governance result: five of the six governance measures sig-
nificantly show that poorly governed firms are more likely to sponsor DB plans. This is the first
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indication of entrenched managers electing to pay employees, albeit in future payments, so that
a manager may extract some personal benefit. This entrenched manager/DB plan result implies
something in the line of Cronqvist et al (2009) results, and also suggests managerial behavior in
line with Bertrand and Mullainathan’s (2003) quiet life result. These results are robust to di↵erent
instruments (as mentioned above) and lags of these instruments.
5.2 2nd Stage - Pension Management
In order to study this further, I look at several di↵erent variables that reflect corporate
pension policy and how these managers pay their employee pensions. As mentioned above, in the
second stage of the Heckman model I look at how di↵erent governed firms fund their DB plans
(FundedStatus) and the volatility of their funded status (FundedStatusV olatility), how they
manage their growth in DB plan assets ( LogPen), growth in DB plan liabilities ( LogPL), the
level of DB plan assets (LogPenAssets), the level of DB plan liabilities (LogPenLiabs), the DB plan
assets per employee (LogPaPerEmp) and the DB plan liabilities per employee (LogP lPerEmp).
To the extent that pension payments are directly associated with employees, the employee scaled
variables are necessary to my study. These variables were also scaled by firm assets and the
results were robust to the di↵erent specification. As discussed above, managers can have significant
discretion on some aspects of pension plan management, including setting the discount rates for
future obligations and rates of return for pension assets. As such, I also study the impact of
governance on other variables such as WellFunded, LowDisc and ExcessROR. The following
sections will break down the pension management dependent variables in order to have a clearer
picture of the results, and a discussion section after the results will explain the findings further.
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5.2.1 Funded Status
The first analysis looks at a DB plan’s FundedStatus, and the results can be found in Table
7. Recall that the FundedStatus variable takes into account all future pension benefit obligations.
The table shows results using the six di↵erent governance variables mentioned in previous sections.
Starting at column number (1) in Table 7, I find that larger and older firms fund their DB plans
better, holding all else constant. As theory suggests, more unionized firms fund their DB plans
itbetter, and that is also evident in the results shown in column (1). Table 7 also shows that funded
status of a firm is strongly correlated with the market return. Firms in less competitive industries,
as proxied by IndGM , show better funded status than firms in more competitive industries on
average. The interesting result here is associated with the governance variable; still looking at
column (1) in Table 7, I find that poorly governed firms, as measured by LogMedOwner, have
better funded status on their DB plans. This result shows that while entrenched managers may
carry more DB plan liabilities (as will be discussed in later sections), they have enough DB plan
assets to cover them. All the previous results are significant at the 1% level. The funded status
result in Table 7 is robust to di↵erent measures of governance and most are significant at 1% level
as well. This can be seen in columns (2) through (6) in Table 7; poorly governed firms have a better
funded status than better governed firms.
Other specifications of governance in Table 7 shed some light on other firm characteristics.
As can be seen in columns (2) through (6), firms with more growth in sales fund their DB plans
better. Less levered firms on average tend to have better funded status. Looking at ROA, I also
find that more profitable firms have better funded status on average in some specifications in Table
7.
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5.2.2 Pension Plan Assets
Table 8 shows the e↵ect of governance on the level of pension plan assets. Again, starting
with column (1) in Table 8 I find the larger, and older, the firm the more pension assets a firm has.
Once again one would expect these pension assets to be highly positively correlated with market
returns, and that is evident as well in Table 8. Firms with more growth opportunities, and less
profitable firms show higher levels of pension assets. More unionized firms have more pension assets
on their books. Firms in less competitive industries carry more pension assets on their books, as
proxied by IndGM . I also find evidence of firms being in Fortune Magazine’s “100 Best Companies
To Work For in America” list have lower levels of pension assets. Although not consistent through
all the specifications in columns (1) though (6) I do find some evidence that less levered firms do
have more pension assets. The main result in the table shows that poorly governed firms have
more pension assets, holding all else constant. The results of other governance variables are are in
line with column (1) and they also show that poorly governed firms do have more pension assets,
and that is evident in columns (2) through (6) in Table 8.
5.2.3 Pension Plan Assets per Employee
Table 9 shows the results using DB plan assets scaled by the number of employees. Looking
at column (1), I find that, holding everything else constant, firms with lower SalesGrowth (and less
Leverage) corresponds to more pension assets per employee and once again older firms carry more
pension assets per employee, on average. TobinsQ has a positive correlation with pension assets
per employee, suggesting that firms with more growth opportunities have more pension assets per
employee. Pension assets per employee are also positively correlated with market returns, as one
would expect. More unionized firms have more pension assets per employee, and relatively less
profitable firms have more pension assets per employee. Employee satisfaction, as proxied by BC,
43
is positively related to pension assets per employee. I also find that firms with more pension assets
per employee operate in less competitive industries. Once again our main result is the governance
variable, and as be seen in column (1) LogMedOwner shows a strong negative correlation with
pension assets per employee, meaning that poorly governed firms have more pension assets per
employee, all else constant. The results are statistically insignificant across the columns when
using other governance measures in columns (2) through (6) and show mixed insignificant results.
5.2.4 Growth in Pension Plan Assets
The previous tables show that poorly governed firms have, on average, more pension plan
assets and fund their pension plans better. Table 10 looks at the annual growth in these pension
plan assets and shows that firms with more SalesGrowth and less Leverage, on average, have
more growth in their pension assets. Market return is positively related to the growth in pension
assets, The interesting findings in this table is that firm age, governance, employee satisfaction,
and union membership variables change signs: youngerfirms, more satisfied employees, lower union
memberships in the industry, and better governed firms tend to have more growth in their pension
assets.
While this may sound counterintuitive and go against the previous result this actually makes
sense: since these older and poorly governed firms in highly unionized industries have larger levels of
pension assets to begin with, the annual growth in assets in the better governed firms is higher due
to path dependency in the data. These well governed firms operating in less unionized industries
have lower pension assets to begin with as shown in Tables 8 and 9, and as such they gain more
traction in terms of the growth in these pension asset accounts. Again, these results are consistent
across several di↵erent governance variables used in columns (2) through (6).
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5.2.5 Pension Plan Liabilities
The following three sections will look at the relationship between pension plans’ projected
benefit obligations. These obligations, or as I call them in my paper pension plan liabilities, take
into account all current and future employee pension obligations. Table 11 shows the results of
the level of pension plan liabilities and I find that larger firms, firms with more sales growth, less
levered and less profitable firms tend to have relatively more pension liabilities than other firms,
on average. In terms of growth opportunities, firms with more growth opportunities tend to have
more pension liabilities. Again, as is in line with theory, the results show that older firms and
firms in more unionized industries have more pension liabilities. Firms with higher industry gross
margins also tend to have more pension plan liabilities. Our governance results also shows that
poorly governed firms, using any governance measure in columns (1) through (6), have more pension
liabilities on their books. A more detailed discussion on this result, as well as the overall picture,
is discussed in later sections.
5.2.6 Pension Plan Liabilities per Employee
Table 12 shows the relationship between firm governance and DB pension plan liabilities
per employee. Column (1) shows results similar to previous DB plan management variables:
SalesGrowth and ROA both have a negative relationship with pension liabilities per employee
respectively, holding all else constant. The results also indicate that older firms with more growth
opportunities have more pension liabilities per employee. Employee satisfaction has a positive re-
lationship with the level of pension liabilities per employee. Once again, more unionized firms have
more pension liabilities per employee. LogMedOwner also has negative relationship with the de-
pendent variable, suggesting that a poorly governed firm has more pension liabilities per employee
holding all else constant. Just like the results on pension assets per employee in Table 9, the
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governance coe cient give us insignificant results when compared across columns (2) through (6).
5.2.7 Growth in Pension Plan Liabilities
Table 13 looks at the e↵ects of governance on the growth of pension plan liabilities. Starting at
column (1), holding all else constant, similar to the previous results, firms with more SalesGrowth
show more growth in pension liabilities. Younger, less unionized firms have more growth in pension
liabilities. Employee satisfaction is strongly positively related to the growth in pension liabilities.
Again, although not consistent through all the regressions in columns (1) through (6) I do find
a positive relationship between ROA and growth in pension liabilities; more profitable firms do
have more annual growth in pension liabilities. The main result in column (1) is the relationship
between governance and pension liabilities, and the table shows that better governed firms have
more annual growth in pension liabilities, holding all else constant.
Again, this may sound counterintuitive at first but when compared with the initial level of
pension liabilities, this results makes sense just like the case with the growth in pension assets
in Table 10. The growth in pension liabilities is higher in younger, less unionized, and better
governed firms because of the lower levels of pension liabilities in those better governed firms in
the first place, and the path dependency in the data dominates the results. Once again the results
of other governance variables are not as consistent across columns (2) through (6) in Table 13.
5.2.8 Funded Status Volatility
Table 14 looks at how governance a↵ects the volatility of the funded status, as measured
by the standard deviation of the DB plan’s funded status. The results in the table throughout
the di↵erent specifications show that, on average, more levered firms, firms with lower growth
opportunities, older and more unionized firms have larger funded status volatility. The table also
shows that poorly governed firms also have more volatility in their funded status in nearly all the
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governance measures used.
5.2.9 Low Discount Rates on Pension Liabilities
Table 15 looks at the impact of governance on the discount rate used to value future pension
obligations. As described above the pension benefit obligations include all projected future salary
increases and adds them onto the final pension figure. That final pension figure is then discounted
back to the present and is valued accordingly. The variable LowDisc looks at discount rates lower
than the sample median. As shown in Table 15, once again less levered firms, less profitable firms,
and firms with more sales growth tend to have lower discount rates than the median. The table also
shows that these lower-than-the-median discount rates are extremely sensitive to market returns.
The interesting results in this table are the PerMem and the governance variables; lower percent
membership in unions corresponds with lower discount rates, and better governed firms, on average,
tend to have lower discount rates than the median. The governance results though out columns
(2) through (6) mostly corroborate this result. The sections following the results will discuss the
implications of these actions in more detail.
5.2.10 Higher Rates of Return on Pension Assets
As discussed above, managers have significant discretion in setting their rate of return on
the pension assets. Table 16 looks at how governance a↵ects setting a certain rate of return
higher than the sample median, ExcessROR. Looking at the table, I find that there is a negative
relationship between ExcessROR and market return. This result indicates some sort of managerial
manipulation to smooth their reported earnings on their pension assets in market downturns.
We also see firms with higher leverage tend to have higher than the median ExcessROR. More
membership in unions in a firm’s industry corresponds to higher rates of return on pension assets.
The results also show that the firms operating in less competitive industries tend to have pension
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asset rates of returns higher than the median. The results in column (1) also show that, on
average, poorly governed firms assume higher rates of return on their pension assets. This result,
once again, indicates further that managerial manipulation is rife when setting assumed long-term
rates of returns on their pension assets, especially in poorly governed firms. The other governance
variables in columns (2) through (6) do show some indication of the same result.
5.2.11 “Well Funded” Plans
The results above give us a well rounded idea on how these pension plans are managed by
di↵erent managers. It is also interesting to look at a subsection of the data and see how, and by
whom, the better funded plans are managed. I use aWellFunded dummy variable to to distinguish
between the plans, and these better funded plans (WellFunded = 1) are assumed to be those that
are funded above the median level of fundedness. Table 3 shows the median funded status the
sample is 84%, and as such any plan that is funded above 84% will be assigned a WellFunded
status.36
Table 17 looks at the likelihood of sponsoring a WellFunded plan, and shows that older,
larger firms, firms with lower sales growth and higher employee productivity in the industry, and
firms with larger union membership on average tend to have a higher likelihood of sponsoring a
WellFunded plan. Firms with higher marginal tax rates are more likely to fund their pension plan
better than the median. Once again I find that firms on Fortune Magazine’s “100 Best Companies
To Work For in America” list are less likely to have a WellFunded plan, and also find that firms
in less competitive industries have a higher likelihood of having a WellFunded plan. In terms
of governance, across all the di↵erent governance specifications I find that poorly governed firms
on average do, in fact, have an increased likelihood of funding their plans more than the median
funded status.
36I also looked at median funded levels per industry and found it was not di↵erent to the overall median funded
status
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I next look at how governance a↵ects these well funded plans in a Heckman 2-Stage regression
with the WellFunded dummy as the dependent variable and the original pension choice regression
in the 1st stage. Table 18 shows the results and they are consistent with previous results: older
firms, larger firms, with lower leverage and higher union membership operating in less competitive
industries tend to fund their plans better than the median. In terms of governance, once again I
find that poorly governed firms tend to fund their plans better than the median and the result is
consistent across several di↵erent governance specifications.
5.2.12 Marginal Tax Rates37
In this section I look at whether marginal tax rates a↵ect a firm’s corporate pension pol-
icy. Table 19 looks at the 1st stage Heckman probit regression, and the same initial results are
there showing that older firms, larger firms, firms with higher levels of leverage and lower growth
opportunities, firms with higher employee productivity and firms in more unionized industries are
more likely to sponsor DB plans. Firms on Fortune Magazine’s “100 Best Companies To Work
For in America” list are less likely to sponsor DB plans, and firms in less competitive industries
are more likely to sponsor such plans. Governance results once again hold throughout all di↵erent
governance measures and show that poorly governed firms are more likely to sponsor DB plans.
In terms of tax rates, the table shows that firms with higher marginal tax rates are more likely to
sponsor DB plans, in line with theory relating tax benefits with pension plans. Once again, this
result holds across all the di↵erent specifications in columns (1) through (6).
Table 20 shows the results of the 2nd stage Heckman for corporate pension policy including
MTR as an independent variable, using only my main governance measure, LogMedOwner to
control for governance. All results documented above still hold in terms of firm size, sales growth,
37I repeat the regressions above and include MTR as an independent variable. The regressions were repeated
since the marginal tax rate data decreases the data by more than 2500 firm-year observations. As such, I did not
want the results above to be judged solely on lower observations due to lack of tax rate data for all firms in all years
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firm age, leverage, degree of unionization, industry concentration and governance with respect to
corporate policies on pensions. Table 20 shows that firms that have higher marginal tax rates fund
their plans better than others, on average. Firms with higher marginal tax rates also show more
growth in their pension liabilities, higher levels of pension assets on their books, as well as higher
pension assets per employee.
5.3 Discussion of Results
Putting all the previous results together gives us a relatively clearer picture as to how these
DB plans are managed. The previous results show that entrenched managers are not only more
active in managing their employees pension plans, but also manage it in a way that keeps their
employees happy. The tables show that while entrenched managers may be more generous and hold
more pension liabilities on their books, they hold enough pension assets to cover them, hence giving
them better funded status. As per the pension laws stated above, a manager does not necessarily
need to fund the DB plans fully and can use the cash generated for other areas in the firm. So
why do entrenched managers keep their DB plans funded more than other managers? Tables 6-20
also show that this better management in DB plans occurs in industries where more employees are
union members. Union conflicts with managers is a widely documented issue, especially regarding
corporate pension policy, and the evidence here suggests that entrenched managers bypass these
conflicts by funding their DB plans better than other managers; in other words, managers are
looking for the quiet life when dealing with conflict-inclined unions.
The results associated with employee satisfaction show some mixed results. We do observe
a positive correlation in the data between governance and employee satisfaction, and as such we
expect to see similar patterns arising in terms of the corporate pension policy results. We do see
that these BC firms are less likely to sponsor DB plans in the first place, and upon sponsoring such
a plan we do see a negative correlation between employee satisfaction and the aggregate levels of
pension assets and liabilities. However, we also see a strong positive correlation between employee
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satisfaction and pension assets and liabilities on a per employee basis. This result shows that in the
less likely event that these BC do sponsor DB plans, they would carry more assets and liabilities
per employee to keep employees satisfied.
In terms of tax benefits, I document the use of DB plans for firms with higher marginal tax
rates. In terms corporate pension policy for firms with higher marginal tax rates, I find that not
only do these firms have a higher likelihood of sponsoring DB plans, but they also fund their DB
plans better. These firms, conditional on sponsoring a DB plan, also tend to have higher pension
assets per employee. This follows theory around tax benefits and pension plans, and suggests that
firms are taking advantage of the tax rules associated with pension contributions tax deductibility.
Looking at other factors in the previous tables also explains other interesting issues. While the
tables show that poorly governed firms have more pension assets and liabilities than better governed
firms, the setting of interest rates associated with both accounts seems to be a factor. Poorly
governed firms tend to assume higher-than-the-median rates of return on their assets. They also
assume higher-than-the-median discount rates on their future obligations. The negative relationship
between funded status volatility and corporate governance also implies managerial opportunism in
managing these plans. The data also shows that managers in less competitive industries tend to fund
their plans better than others. Putting those results together indicates that poorly governed firms
may be managing their pension funds in a way to keep their employees happy, but not necessarily in
the correct way. The tables show that these above/below the median rates of return and discount
rates occur in more unionized industries, all the more support to the notion of managers pleasing
employees and avoiding tensions with unions. The data shows that these poorly governed firms are
underestimating their future obligations (by discounting them more heavily than other firms) and
also overestimating the returns on their pension assets, relative to the other firms (by having a rate
of return higher than other firms.) The regressions were also conducted on above (below) industry
medians of ROR (discount rate), and the results were nearly identical.
This result also implies that managers with more control tend to pay, at least in future terms,
their employees better as per Cronqvist et al (2009). As per Jensen and Meckling (1976) several
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types of benefits to CEOs arise by paying their employees more, such as better relationships with
employees and/or more loyalty towards the CEO. The evidence in Tables 6-20 clearly shows that
entrenched managers are promising to pay their employees better, even if they are future promises
and not actual money changing hands today. Employees, whether union members or not, recognize
that their future payments are being funded better and as such there won’t be conflicts between
management and employees about pension pay - no conflicts means better relationships between
the two.
Overall, the results imply that DB plan assets, liabilities, and overall fundedness are nega-
tively related to firm governance. This is in line with Jensen and Meckling (1976) agency model
for managers’ utility generated by non-pecuniary activities, and the results do support Bertrand
and Mullainathan’s (2003) quiet life argument.
5.4 CEO Characteristics and Compensation
The previous section showed that entrenched CEOs promise to pay their employees better
than other CEOs, and as such this section will look at what makes these CEOs di↵erent. One
would expect that CEOs looking for the quiet life would have a compensation package that is
mostly guaranteed pay and not largely incentive based if they have enough control to set their
own compensation. Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) show in their paper that CEOs do not
undergo any value decreasing acquisitions by acquiring new plants, nor do they take down any
existing plants; this shows CEOs are satisfied with the status quo. One would also be interested in
looking at the size of the total compensation package. Total compensation could go either way; one
would assume that CEOs looking for the quiet life would do so in all aspects of their job and not
necessarily start conflicts with the board over larger compensation packages. Another interesting
avenue to explore would be to see if “managers who place a great value on control and own only
a small equity stake have an incentive to pay high wages” as per Pagano and Volpin (2005). It is
interesting to see if that also extends to promises of future payments as well.
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The selection regressions (1) and (2) were conducted again but this time the vector Xi in
both equations included an extra variable (or variables) that examines CEO characteristics.
5.4.1 Defined Benefits Plans and CEO Characteristics
Table 21 shows the results of the first stage Heckman with CEO characteristics included and
using only my main governance measure, LogMedOwner, to control for governance. The results
from the previous Heckman in Table 6 are the same in terms of lower governance, lower industry
competition, and other factors that a↵ect defined benefit plan selection, but now we see in columns
(1) through (8) that higher CEO salary corresponds to increased likelihood of having a DB plan. I
also find that less percent salary of total compensation, lower value of CEO shares owned and more
total compensation all increasing the likelihood of sponsoring a DB plan. What is interesting is the
CEO’s percent ownership in the firm, and column (5) clearly shows that the lower the ownership
stake of the CEO in the firm, the higher the probability of sponsoring a DB plan. This gives us
an indication of what Pagano and Volpin (2005) show in their paper exists for future promises as
well. Column 7 shows that more percent of total pay earned as bonuses to the CEO corresponds
positively with sponsoring a DB plan.
Column (8) puts the three CEO compensation factors together - percent salary, percent
ownership in the firm, and percent bonus - and the results still hold, as well as the governance
result that holds throughout the 8 specifications in Table 21.
5.4.2 CEOs and Funded Status
Table 22 looks at whether CEO characteristics and compensation structure a↵ect the funded
status of a DB plan. Starting with the governance variable, I find that it is significant and holds
in nearly all of the specifications in the table (it is not significant in one of the specifications most
probably because of lack of enough observations. It is no coincidence that these specifications in
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columns (2) and (5) are related to ownership, and it might be a case of collinearity).
Starting with column (1), we see that lower CEO salary corresponds to higher fundedness of
a firm’s DB plan. I find a similar result in column (3) for total compensation, and find that it is
negatively related to funded status. In terms of percent guaranteed compensation, Table 22 shows
that higher guaranteed compensation (in terms of salary) corresponds to a better funded DB plan.
The table also shows lower bonuses paid to the CEO corresponds to higher funded status.
5.5 Discussion of Results - CEO Characteristics
The previous section clearly shows a relationship exists between CEO compensation and DB
plan management, but it does not set any compensation schemes for firms that concentrate their
e↵orts on DB plans as this is not the goal of this section, nor does it recommend any overarching
compensation hypotheses to minimize the e↵ects they have on pension plan management. Tables
21 and 22 do, however, show the existence of a trend between DB plan corporate policy and CEO
pay that follows in the quiet life theme; entrenched managers that fund their DB plans better
have a higher percentage of guaranteed pay (salary) in their compensation package, which follows
the premise of this paper relating entrenchment/lower governance with better fundedness; these
CEOs also operate in less competitive industries, and also have a relatively lower total compen-
sation package. The tables also show that the governance measure holds throughout the di↵erent
specifications. The lower total compensation may be because these quiet-life-seeking CEOs do not
want to engage in battle with the board over their pay that would ultimately sour the relationships
between them (example of Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) non-pecuniary benefits), as long as their
guaranteed pay is relatively larger than others.
These firms also operate in less competitive industries and the firms are poorly governed,
a combination that gives the manager substantial slack in how a firm operates with regards to
di↵erent stakeholders as a result of this lower competitiveness and lower monitoring surrounding
a manager’s activities. These results, coupled with the fact that these entrenched CEOs have a
larger portion of their compensation package that is guaranteed, clearly show that these managers
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do not need nor have enough incentive (and probably do not have the desire) to build new plants
and expand more since their compensation structure is not as sensitive towards better performance
measures as others, which further strengthens Bertrand and Mullainathan’s (2003) quiet life result
within this paper’s scope.
The evidence on CEO characteristics may not necessarily show direct causality, but it cer-
tainly does show the existence of such a relationship between entrenched CEOs and DB plan
management, and needs to be studied in further extensions of this field.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
Using a large panel data set on defined benefit pension plans of U.S. companies and respective
corporate governance measures, I document the e↵ect of governance on the management of these
DB plans. I find that poorly governed firms tend to manage their DB plans better; the pension
liabilities increase but so do the pension assets, leading to a more funded DB plan. Pension assets
and liabilities on an employee basis are also larger in these poorly governed firms. Poorly governed
firms are also more likely to sponsor plans funded better than the median plan, and on average
these firms assume higher rates of returns on their pension assets, as well as having higher discount
rates on their future pension obligations. This can be viewed as evidence of an agency problem of
entrenched managers promising more wages to employees and taking advantage of non-pecuniary
benefits such as employee loyalty and better relations with sta↵. The data also shows signs of
problems surrounding separation of ownership and control because of CEO cash flow rights and
ownership being negatively correlated to employee compensation, and statistically significant.
This better management of DB plans in poorly governed firms is persistent even when con-
trolling for union-intense industries. This signals a manager’s reluctance in engaging in conflicts
with unions. These firms also tend to operate in more concentrated industries than other firms - a
sign of managers wanting to live “the quiet life”. Further evidence of the quiet life can be seen in
the CEO compensation package - CEOs that manage their employees’ DB plans better have a larger
guaranteed portion (salary) as part of their compensation package, a probable sign of CEOs lack of
desire to be aggressively increasing firms growth prospects and happy with the status quo. These
56
findings are consistent with managers preferring the quiet life and CEOs enjoying non-pecuniary
benefits from lower e↵ort in future wage bargaining, as well as better social relationships with
employees.
The evidence presented in this paper adds to the existing literature relating agency problems
to managerial private benefits. Entrenched managers have large discretion over the o↵-balance-sheet
items that provide attractive benefits to them, such as loyalty and better relations, as previously
documented by Cronqvist et al (2009) and theorized by Jensen and Meckling (1976). It also adds
to Bertrand and Mullainathan’s (2003) quiet life claim, and shows that entrenched managers do
prefer to fly under the radar and in order to enjoy the quiet life.
Further extensions of this field should look at how CEOs manage specific DB plans based
on employee proximity, both geographical and hierarchal. It would also be beneficial to study why
exactly do CEOs of better governed firms not manage their pension plans as well as CEOs of poorly
governed firms. Another potential area of research down the line would be to study the e↵ects of
the Pension Protection Act of 2006 and see whether the new funding rules that went into e↵ect in
2008 changed how the pension system operates as whole.
57 
 
References 
 
Anantharaman, Divya, and Yong Gyu Lee. "Managerial risk taking incentives and corporate pension 
policy." Journal of Financial Economics 111.2 (2014): 328-351. 
 
Bebchuk, Lucian, Alma Cohen, and Allen Ferrell. "What matters in corporate governance?." Review of 
Financial Studies 22.2 (2009): 783-827. 
Bergstresser, Daniel, Mihir Desai, and Joshua Rauh. "Earnings manipulation, pension assumptions, and 
managerial investment decisions." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 121.1 (2006): 157-195. 
Bertrand, Marianne, and Sendhil Mullainathan. "Enjoying the quiet life? Corporate governance and 
managerial preferences." Journal of Political Economy 111.5 (2003): 1043-1075. 
Bhagat, Sanjai, and Brian Bolton. "Corporate governance and firm performance." Journal of Corporate 
Finance 14.3 (2008): 257-273. 
Bhagat, S., Shleifer, A., Vishny, R. W., Jarrel, G., & Summers, L. (1990). Hostile takeovers in the 1980s: 
The return to corporate specialization.Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Microeconomics, 1-84. 
Bhojraj, Sanjeev, Charles Lee, and Derek K. Oler. "What's my line? A comparison of industry classification 
schemes for capital market research." Journal of Accounting Research 41.5 (2003): 745-774. 
Black, Fischer. "Should You Use Stocks to Hedge Your Pension Liability?" Financial Analysts 
Journal (1989): 10-12. 
Bodie, Zvi. "What the pension benefit guaranty corporation can learn from the federal savings and loan 
insurance corporation." Journal of Financial Services Research 10.1 (1996): 83-100. 
Bodie, Zvi, Jay O. Light, Randall Morck, and Robert A. Taggart Jr. "Corporate pension policy: An empirical 
investigation." Financial Analysts Journal (1985): 10-16. 
Bowers, Helen M., and Norman H. Moore. "Market valuation of excess pension assets: Evidence from the 
market for corporate control." Journal of Risk and Insurance (1995): 214-229. 
Boyce, Steven, and Richard A. Ippolito. "The cost of pension insurance." Journal of Risk and 
Insurance 69.2 (2002): 121-170. 
Brown, Jeffrey R. “Guaranteed trouble: the economic effects of the pension benefit guaranty corporation.” 
No. w13438. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2007. 
Brown, Jeffrey R., Robert Clark, and Joshua Rauh. "The economics of state and local pensions." Journal 
of Pension Economics and Finance 10.2 (2011): 161. 
Bulow, Jeremy I., Randall Morck, and Lawrence H. Summers. "How does the market value unfunded 
pension liabilities?." Issues in Pension Economics. University of Chicago Press, 1987. 81-110. 
Cadman, Brian, and Linda Vincent. "The Role of Defined Benefit Pension Plans in Executive 
Compensation." Available at SSRN 1783866 (2011). 
Cronqvist, Henrik, Fredrik Heyman, Mattias Nilsson, Helena Svaleryd, and Jonas Vlachos. "Do 
entrenched managers pay their workers more?" The Journal of Finance 64, no. 1 (2009): 309-339. 
58 
 
Edmans, Alex. "Does the stock market fully value intangibles? Employee satisfaction and equity 
prices." Journal of Financial Economics 101.3 (2011): 621-640. 
Edmans, Alex, and Qi Liu. "Inside debt*." Review of Finance 15.1 (2011): 75-102. 
Foster, Ann C. "Portability of pension benefits among jobs." Monthly labor review (1994): 45-50. 
Gerakos, Joseph. "Chief executive officers and the pay–pension tradeoff." Journal of Pension Economics 
& Finance 9.2 (2010): 303. 
Gompers, Paul, Joy Ishii, and Andrew Metrick. "Corporate governance and equity prices." The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 118.1 (2003): 107-156. 
Graham, John R. "Debt and the marginal tax rate." Journal of Financial Economics 41.1 (1996): 41-73. 
 
Hall, Robert E. "The importance of lifetime jobs in the US economy." (1984). 
 
Hawkins, David F., “Retiree Pension and Health Benefits”; Harvard Business School Accounting & 
Management Unit. (August 26, 2010).  HBS Case No. 111-033 
Hirsch, Barry T., and David A. Macpherson. "Union membership and coverage database from the current 
population survey: Note." Indus. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 56 (2002): 349. 
Hoberg, Gerard, and Gordon Phillips. "Real and financial industry booms and busts." The Journal of 
Finance 65.1 (2010): 45-86. 
Ippolito, Richard A. "How to Reduce the Cost of Federal Pension Insurance." Policy Analysis, August 2004. 
Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure." Journal of financial economics 3.4 (1976): 305-360. 
Kumar, Jayesh. "Impact of Pension Plan Funding Status on M&A Activity."Jayesh Kumar, Michael 
Orszag, Mirko Cardinale and Gabriel Katz, BACKGROUND RISK AND PENSIONS: British Actuarial 
Journal 12.1 (2006): 79-134. 
Lazear, Edward P. "Incentive contracts." (1986). 
Lewis, Jonathan, and Melwani, Vivek. “Treatment of Pension Plans When an Employer is In Bankruptcy.” 
Benders Labor and Employment Bulletin April (2006) 
Lewis, Christopher M., and George G. Pennacchi. "Valuing insurance for defined-benefit pension 
plans." Advances in Futures and Options Research 10 (1999): 135-168. 
Lucas, Deborah, and Stephen P. Zeldes. "Valuing and hedging defined benefit pension obligations - The 
role of stocks revisited." Northwestern University and Columbia University, working paper, 
September (2006). 
Lunn, Jason “Competition and Corporate Investment Policy”, Working Paper 2014 
Mitchell, Olivia S. "Fringe benefits and labor mobility." Journal of Human Resources 17.2 (1982): 286-
298. 
Munnell, Alicia, Aubry, Jean-Pierre, Josh Hurwitz, and Laura Quinby. Comparing compensation: State-
local versus private sector workers. Center for State & Local Government Excellence, 2011. 
59 
 
Munnell, Alicia H., and Mauricio Soto. “Why are companies freezing their pensions?” Center For 
Retirement Research at Boston College, 2007. 
 
Novy-Marx, Robert, and Joshua D. Rauh. "The liabilities and risks of state-sponsored pension plans." The 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 23.4 (2009): 191-210. 
Novy‐Marx, Robert, and Joshua Rauh. "Public pension promises: how big are they and what are they 
worth?." The Journal of Finance 66.4 (2011): 1211-1249. 
Pagano, Marco, and Paolo F. Volpin. "Managers, workers, and corporate control." The Journal of 
Finance 60.2 (2005): 841-868. 
Pennacchi, George, and Mahdi Rastad. "Portfolio allocation for public pension funds." Journal of Pension 
Economics and finance 10.2 (2011): 221-245. 
Perun, Pamela, and Joseph J. Valenti. "Defined Benefit Plans: Going, Going, Gone?" Thirtieth Annual 
APPAM Research Conference. 2008. 
 
Phan, Hieu V., and Shantaram P. Hegde. "Corporate Governance and Risk Taking in Pension Plans: 
Evidence from Defined Benefit Asset Allocations."  Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 48.03 
(2013): 919-946. 
 
Picconi, Marc. "The perils of pensions: Does pension accounting lead investors and analysts astray?" The 
Accounting Review 81.4 (2006): 925-955. 
Pontiff, Jeffrey, Andrei Shleifer, and Michael S. Weisbach. "Reversions of excess pension assets after 
takeovers." The RAND Journal of Economics (1990): 600-613. 
Rauh, Joshua D. "Investment and financing constraints: Evidence from the funding of corporate pension 
plans." The Journal of Finance 61.1 (2006): 33-71. 
Rauh, Joshua D., Irina Stefanescu, and Stephen P. Zeldes. “Cost shifting and the freezing of corporate 
pension plans.” Working Paper: Stanford University, 2012. 
Rauh, Joshua. "The pension bomb." The Milken Institute Review (2011). 
Schieber, Sylvester J. "Political economy of public sector retirement plans." Journal of Pension Economics 
and finance 10.2 (2011): 269. 
Schultz, Ellen E. Retirement Heist: How Companies Plunder and Profit from the Nest Eggs of American 
Workers. Penguin.com, 2011. 
Shivdasani, Anil, and Irina Stefanescu. "How do pensions affect corporate capital structure 
decisions?" Review of Financial Studies 23.3 (2010): 1287-1323. 
Sundaram, Rangarajan K., and David L. Yermack. "Pay me later: Inside debt and its role in managerial 
compensation." The Journal of Finance 62.4 (2007): 1551-1588. 
Tepper, Irwin. "Taxation and corporate0 pension policy." The Journal of Finance36.1 (1981): 1-13. 
VanDerhei, Jack L. "An empirical analysis of risk-related insurance premiums for the PBGC." Journal of 
Risk and Insurance 57.2 (1990): 240-59. 
60 
 
Wilcox, David W. "Reforming the defined-benefit pension system." Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity 2006.1 (2006): 235-304. 
Wooten, James A. "Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business: The Studebaker-Packard Corporation 
and the Origins   of ERISA." Buff. L. Rev.49 (2001): 683. 
Zion, D. and Carache, B. “The magic of pension accounting. Closing the gap between financial reporting 
and reality.” Credit Suisse first Boston research report, AIMR 2002 Conference proceedings, 24–35 
  
Appendix A
Variable Definitions
Governance Variables
LogMedOwner: As described in Bhagat and Bolton (2008), this variable is the log of the dollar
value of a firm’s median director’s ownership
G  Index: As described in Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) this variable ranges from 0-24, with
a higher score indicating weaker shareholder rights
E   Index: As described in Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell (2004) this variable is a subset of the
G  Index and ranges from 0-6, with a higher score indicating weaker shareholder rights
PercentIndep: Percent independent directors on a firm’s board
SumOut: Percent of firm equity held by outside blockholders
CEO  ChairDuality: Dummy variable set at 1 if CEO is also the Chairman of the board, and 0
otherwise
CEO Compensation Variables
CEOAge: CEO Age
LogCEOSal: Log of the CEO’s salary
LogTDC1: Log of CEOs total compensation including salary, bonus, options and stock grants
LogCEOShares: Log of the market value of shares held by the CEO
LogShares: Log of the number of shares held by CEO, excluding options
%Salary: Percent of total CEO compensation that is salary
62
Pension Plan Management Variables
Pen: Dummy variable indicating whether a firm sponsors a defined benefit pension plan or not
PenAssets: Defined benefit pension assets
PenLiabs: Defined benefit pension liabilities. This is the Pension Benefits Obligations entry and
is a measure of all accumulated and discounted future obligations to employees
 LogPen: Annual growth of firm’s pension assets
 LogPenLiab: Annual growth of firm’s pension liabilities including future obligations
FundedStatus: This variable shows whether or not a firm has enough pension assets to cover all its
pension liabilities. It is calculated as PenAssets/PenLiabs, and accordingly a value greater than 1
indicates that the firm does have enough pension assets to cover all its pension benefit obligations,
and a value less than 1 indicates otherwise
FundedStatusV olatility: This variable measures the volatility of a firm’s funded status
LogP lPerEmp: Log of Pension Liabilities per Employee
LogPaPerEmp: Log of Pension Assets per Employee
WellFunded: Firms with funded status better than the sample median
LowDisc: Firms with pension discount rates (used to discount future obligations) lower than the
sample median
ExcessROR: Firms with rates of return on pension assets greater than the sample median
LogIndMedPen: Log of the 2 digit SIC industry median pension assets
LogIndMeanPen: Log of the 2 digit SIC industry mean pension assets
MeanDBSIC2yr: Mean number of firms in 2 digit SIC industry with DB plans
63
Financial Variables
LogSale: Log of firm’s total sales
SalesGrowth: Annual sales growth of firm
Leverage: Log of firm’s long term debt scaled by firm assets
TobinsQ: Tobin’s Q, or Market-to-Book value, measuring firms growth opportunities
ROA: Return on Assets
MarketReturn: Value Weighted yearly market return on the S&P500
LogFirmAge: Log of firm’s age
IndPM : Industry profit margin, set as the mean profit margin (NetIncome/TotalRevenue) within
2 Digit SIC industries
IndGM : Industry gross margin, set as the mean gross margin ((Sales - COGS)/Sales) within 2
Digit SIC industries
Productivity Variables
LogOutput: Log of total industry output
LogProdPerEmp: Log of industry output scaled by number of employees
LogProdPerHour: Log of industry output scaled by total hours of labor input
LogLaborShare: Log of industry output scaled by employee compensation
Unionization, Employee Satisfaction and MTR Variables
Permem: Percentage of employees that are members of a labor union
Percov: Percentage of employees covered under a labor union
Tenure: Average employee tenure per industry
BC: Dummy variable showing whether a firm is included in the Best Companies List in that year.
MTR: Simulated marginal tax rates after deductions for depreciation, interest, and leasing expenses
64 
 
 
Figure 1 – Average Pension Plan Assets 
 
Figure 2 - Median Pension Plan Assets 
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Figure 3 - Average Pension Plan Liabilities 
 
Figure 4 - Median Pension Plan Liabilities 
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Figure 5 - Median Pension Plan Assets Per Employee 
 
Figure 6 - Median Pension Plan Liabilities Per Year 
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Figure 7 - Average Funded Status 
 
Figure 8 - Median Funded Status 
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Figure 9 - Discount Rates Vs. Bond Yields
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Table 1 – Advantages and disadvantages of sponsoring DB plans 
Sponsoring DB Plan Employees Managers Shareholders 
 Advantages 
• Employees would have the 
peace of mind regarding life 
after retirement is secure not 
only from future promises of 
their retirement benefits, but 
they also can take comfort 
from that fact that they bear 
no investment risk regarding 
their pension assets. Pension 
contributions are made by the 
firm, and pension asset 
returns are the results of the 
managerial pension asset 
allocation.  
 
• Managers who fund their plans 
better would enjoy non-pecuniary 
benefits such as loyalty, better 
social relations, and respect from 
employees. 
 
• Managers who fund their plans 
better would also avoid hassle of 
dealing with conflict-inclined 
unions if they keep their employees 
relatively happy. 
• Akerlof and Yellen (1986) and 
Lazear (1986): “Efficiency Wage” 
argument: 
o Less shirking ! Lower 
employee turnover ! Less 
training costs ! More Profits 
 
o Less shirking ! More 
productivity ! Less labor cost 
! More Profits 
 
• Employee satisfaction is linked to 
better firm performance, which in 
turn is linked to better profits for 
shareholders. 
 Disadvantages 
• Employees are less likely to 
switch firms since their future 
pay is tied to this one firm. 
Employees are essentially 
“locked in” to their job. 
 
• Employees know that job 
termination would essentially 
see them lose a large portion 
of their future payments. 
• Decreasing shareholder claims on 
cash flows may lead managers into 
conflicts with shareholders. 
 
• Decreasing bottom line would 
probably decrease manager’s own 
pay, depending on managerial pay 
structure. 
 
• All pension investment risk is 
borne by the firm. 
• More pension contributions made 
by firms means less money left 
over for shareholders.  As such, 
shareholders would not want a 
plan funded mostly by pension 
contributions.   
 
• As prior research has shown, 
shareholders would prefer pension 
funds to hold risker assets in order 
to maximize returns and minimize 
firm contributions to the fund.  
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Table 2 – Summary statistics of all firms 
 
 
  
Variable Obs Mean Median St Dev 
Panel A: Pensions 
Pension Assets ($ Millions) 12730 1266.08 214.44 3206.27 
Pension Benefits Obligations ($ Millions) 12832 1394.61 243.81 3537.97 
Funded Status 12489 0.85 0.84 0.31 
% Equity 6814 57.61 61.00 17.16 
% Debt 6766 34.32 32.90 15.26 
% Real Estate 6628 1.38 0.00 2.80 
% Other 6835 6.36 1.00 12.27 
Discount Rate 11950 6.10 6.05 1.20 
Rate of Return 11429 8.17 8.50 1.42 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
ROA 22699 0.12 0.12 0.16 
Tobin’s Q 22995 1.83 1.43 1.18 
Total Assets ($ Millions) 23234 10186.19 1823.85 30080.89 
Total  Liabilities ($ Millions) 23177 7801.52 992.68 26491.10 
Firm Age (Years) 23305 26.90 22.00 16.54 
Employees (Thousands) 22835 16.16 5.39 26.95 
Log Sales 23205 7.25 7.16 1.56 
Sales Growth 20459 0.02 0.04 0.21 
Industry GM 23276 0.26 0.34 0.36 
Market Return 23382 0.08 0.13 0.19 
% Members in Unions 10177 0.13 0.09 0.11 
% Covered by Unions 10177 0.14 0.10 0.11 
Leverage 23168 0.20 0.17 0.19 
MTR 17196 0.21 0.32 0.16 
Best Companies 23303 0.03 0.00 0.16 
Panel C: Governance Indices 
Log Median Director Ownership 12378 13.73 13.74 1.43 
G-Index 20184 9.07 9.00 2.62 
E-Index 20184 2.19 2.00 1.29 
% Independent Directors 13092 0.67 0.70 0.18 
% Held by Outside Blockholders 3309 15.89 12.80 14.93 
CEO/Chair Duality 13092 0.60 1.00 0.49 
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Table 3 – Summary statistics of firms that sponsor a DB plan 
  
  
Variable Obs Mean Median St Dev 
Panel A: Pensions 
Pension Assets ($ Millions) 12489 1290.49 226.01 3232.20 
Pension Benefits Obligations ($ Millions) 12600 1420.29 253.02 3565.28 
Funded Status (PBO) 12489 0.85 0.84 0.31 
% Equity 6782 57.85 61.00 16.80 
% Debt 6734 34.44 33.00 15.12 
% Real Estate 6596 1.38 0.00 2.80 
% Other 6813 6.37 1.00 12.26 
Discount Rate 11720 6.14 6.05 1.05 
Rate of Return 11233 8.25 8.50 1.17 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
ROA 12491 0.12 0.12 0.08 
Tobin’s Q 12484 1.61 1.33 0.87 
Total Assets ($ Millions) 12598 15868.30 3401.06 38680.39 
Total Liabilities ($ Millions) 12587 12498.74 2162.59 34304.70 
Firm Age (Years) 12598 34.30 37.00 16.94 
Employees (Thousands) 12431 21.26 8.40 30.14 
Log Sales  12594 7.82 7.72 1.42 
Sales Growth 11404 0.01 0.03 0.20 
Industry GM 12600 0.31 0.33 0.26 
Market Return 12600 0.08 0.13 0.20 
% Members in Unions 7786 0.14 0.09 0.11 
% Covered by Unions 7786 0.15 0.10 0.12 
Leverage 12585 0.22 0.20 0.16 
MTR 9265 0.22 0.33 0.15 
Best Companies 12592 0.02 0.00 0.14 
Panel C: Governance Indices 
Log Median Director Ownership 6795 13.46 13.50 1.34 
G-Index 11077 9.72 10.00 2.61 
E-Index 11077 2.39 2.00 1.28 
% Independent Directors 6956 0.71 0.75 0.16 
% Held by Outside Blockholders 2334 14.84 11.20 14.90 
CEO/Chair Duality 6956 0.65 1.00 0.48 
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Table 4 – Summary Statistics of firms that do not sponsor a DB plan 
 
Variable Obs Mean Median St Dev 
Panel A: Pensions 
Pension Assets ($ Millions) 241 0.90 0.00 4.41 
Pension Benefits Obligations ($ Millions) 232 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Funded Status N/A 
% Equity 32 6.38 0.00 17.21 
% Debt 32 8.67 0.00 22.28 
% Real Estate 32 0.16 0.00 0.88 
% Other 22 3.91 0.00 16.44 
Discount Rate 230 3.67 4.90 3.54 
Rate of Return 196 3.66 0.00 4.29 
Panel B: Firm Characteristics 
ROA 10208 0.11 0.12 0.22 
Tobin’s Q 10511 2.09 1.60 1.42 
Total Assets ($ Millions) 10636 3455.92 885.55 10999.87 
Total  Liabilities ($ Millions) 10590 2218.53 391.51 8934.35 
Firm Age (Years) 10707 18.19 15.00 10.84 
Employees (Thousands) 10404 10.07 2.90 20.98 
Log Sales 10611 6.57 6.52 1.44 
Sales Growth 9055 0.02 0.05 0.23 
Industry GM 10676 0.21 0.35 0.44 
Market Return 10782 0.08 0.13 0.19 
% Members in Unions 2391 0.09 0.07 0.09 
% Covered by Unions 2391 0.10 0.07 0.09 
Leverage 10583 0.17 0.11 0.21 
MTR 7931 0.20 0.29 0.16 
Best Companies 10711 0.03 0.00 0.18 
Panel C: Governance Indices 
Log Median Director Ownership 5583 14.06 14.07 1.46 
G-Index 9107 8.27 8.00 2.41 
E-Index 9107 1.94 2.00 1.25 
% Independent Directors 6136 0.63 0.67 0.19 
% Held by Outside Blockholders 975 18.43 16.83 14.72 
CEO/Chair Duality 6136 0.53 1.00 0.50 
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Table 5 – Governance indices correlation matrix 
 
 
Log Median 
Ownership G-Index E-Index 
% Independent 
Directors 
% Held Outside 
Blockholders 
CEO/Chair 
Duality 
Log Median 
Ownership 1           
G-Index -0.0831* 1         
E-Index -0.0944* 0.7215* 1       
% Independent 
Director -0.2132* 0.2375* 0.2478*   1     
% Held Outside 
Blockholders -0.1338* -0.1628*  -0.0854*  -0.0993* 1   
CEO/Chair 
Duality -0.0501* 0.1079*  0.0735*   0.0691* -0.05 1 
* p<0.01 
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Table 6 – 1st Stage Heckman: Results of the pension choice regression 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pen Pen Pen Pen Pen Pen 
       
Log Sales 0.263*** 0.311*** 0.323*** 0.244*** 0.259*** 0.245*** 
 (0.0193) (0.0159) (0.0160) (0.0185) (0.0252) (0.0186) 
Sales Growth -0.0696 0.0206 0.0161 -0.0996 0.146 -0.117 
 (0.121) (0.0955) (0.0957) (0.118) (0.152) (0.118) 
Market Return -0.0470 -0.0949 -0.0984 -0.0627 -0.917*** -0.0646 
 (0.121) (0.107) (0.107) (0.119) (0.190) (0.119) 
Leverage 0.571*** 0.232** 0.234** 0.702*** 0.273 0.619*** 
 (0.149) (0.111) (0.112) (0.141) (0.190) (0.144) 
Tobin’s Q -0.108*** -0.114*** -0.112*** -0.129*** -0.203*** -0.125*** 
 (0.0236) (0.0184) (0.0186) (0.0222) (0.0306) (0.0226) 
Employee Productivity 0.228*** 0.144*** 0.133*** 0.196*** 0.272*** 0.221*** 
 (0.0319) (0.0278) (0.0278) (0.0321) (0.0494) (0.0317) 
Unionization 1.184*** 1.474*** 1.489*** 1.435*** 2.548*** 1.328*** 
 (0.312) (0.270) (0.271) (0.304) (0.381) (0.305) 
ROA 0.0207 0.275 0.286 0.227 0.530 0.207 
 (0.294) (0.190) (0.196) (0.281) (0.397) (0.282) 
Firm Age 0.349*** 0.376*** 0.424*** 0.294*** 0.569*** 0.316*** 
 (0.0295) (0.0261) (0.0256) (0.0278) (0.0457) (0.0274) 
Industry GM 0.717*** 0.216 0.227 0.664*** 0.936*** 0.605*** 
 (0.195) (0.165) (0.164) (0.192) (0.282) (0.192) 
BC -0.481*** -0.467*** -0.428*** -0.475*** -0.393** -0.496*** 
 (0.102) (0.107) (0.106) (0.103) (0.174) (0.104) 
Log Medowner -0.0813***      
 (0.0170)      
G-Index  0.0735***     
  (0.00727)     
E-Index   0.143***    
   (0.0149)    
% Indep Directors    1.076***   
    (0.117)   
Outside Blocks     0.000489  
     (0.00216)  
CEO-Chair Duality      0.152*** 
      (0.0436) 
Constant -3.944*** -5.072*** -4.835*** -5.063*** -6.560*** -4.792*** 
 (0.454) (0.354) (0.351) (0.404) (0.645) (0.400) 
       
Observations 6,579 7,511 7,511 6,739 2,692 6,739 
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Table 7 - Heckman 2nd Stage: Governance and DB plan Funded Status 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Funded Status Funded Status Funded Status Funded Status Funded Status Funded Status 
       
Log Sales 0.0338*** 0.0294*** 0.0266*** 0.0313*** 0.0122* 0.0318*** 
 (0.00472) (0.00514) (0.00533) (0.00450) (0.00701) (0.00463) 
Sales Growth -0.00822 -0.0125 -0.0132 -0.0272 0.0826*** -0.0287 
 (0.0212) (0.0199) (0.0199) (0.0211) (0.0311) (0.0212) 
Market Return 0.322*** 0.300*** 0.300*** 0.322*** 0.694*** 0.321*** 
 (0.0219) (0.0208) (0.0208) (0.0218) (0.0419) (0.0219) 
Leverage -0.0580** -0.0500** -0.0534** -0.0297 -0.0336 -0.0184 
 (0.0294) (0.0248) (0.0248) (0.0297) (0.0459) (0.0293) 
Tobin’s Q -0.0116* -0.0176*** -0.0159*** -0.0165*** -0.0330*** -0.0180*** 
 (0.00617) (0.00572) (0.00570) (0.00619) (0.0103) (0.00621) 
Unionization 0.471*** 0.492*** 0.478*** 0.532*** 0.334*** 0.539*** 
 (0.0497) (0.0470) (0.0469) (0.0497) (0.0873) (0.0500) 
ROA 0.0843 0.155** 0.154** 0.0729 0.260** 0.0783 
 (0.0688) (0.0627) (0.0628) (0.0685) (0.110) (0.0686) 
Firm Age 0.0387*** 0.0454*** 0.0424*** 0.0444*** 0.0441** 0.0460*** 
 (0.00921) (0.00869) (0.00925) (0.00810) (0.0186) (0.00861) 
BC -0.0194 -0.0225 -0.0178 -0.0238 0.0280 -0.0260 
 (0.0238) (0.0232) (0.0231) (0.0239) (0.0460) (0.0241) 
Industry GM 0.328*** 0.297*** 0.295*** 0.308*** 0.238*** 0.311*** 
 (0.0349) (0.0316) (0.0316) (0.0346) (0.0674) (0.0345) 
Log Medowner -0.0245***      
 (0.00330)      
G-Index  0.00301     
  (0.00186)     
E-Index   0.00353    
   (0.00373)    
% Indep Directors    -0.0594**   
    (0.0302)   
Outside Blocks     -0.00184***  
     (0.000451)  
CEO-Chair Duality      0.0175** 
      (0.00875) 
Constant 0.619*** 0.274*** 0.336*** 0.332*** 0.629*** 0.259*** 
 (0.0721) (0.0863) (0.0850) (0.0817) (0.131) (0.0726) 
       
Observations 6,544 7,471 7,471 6,702 2,685 6,702 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 8 - Heckman 2nd Stage: Governance and Pension Plan Assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pension Assets Pension Assets Pension Assets Pension Assets Pension Assets Pension Assets 
       
Log Sales 1.065*** 1.055*** 1.060*** 1.034*** 1.039*** 1.027*** 
 (0.0191) (0.0214) (0.0221) (0.0185) (0.0255) (0.0189) 
Sales Growth 0.138 0.152* 0.150* 0.00777 0.0232 -0.00766 
 (0.0863) (0.0843) (0.0841) (0.0875) (0.114) (0.0871) 
Market Return 0.274*** 0.263*** 0.263*** 0.252*** 0.645*** 0.253*** 
 (0.0886) (0.0883) (0.0881) (0.0903) (0.152) (0.0898) 
Leverage -0.140 -0.0662 -0.0608 0.115 -0.410** 0.0206 
 (0.120) (0.105) (0.104) (0.123) (0.168) (0.121) 
Tobin’s Q 0.104*** 0.0515** 0.0559** 0.0548** 0.0129 0.0619** 
 (0.0244) (0.0237) (0.0236) (0.0247) (0.0376) (0.0248) 
Unionization 4.146*** 4.414*** 4.399*** 4.537*** 4.497*** 4.450*** 
 (0.201) (0.199) (0.198) (0.205) (0.315) (0.205) 
ROA -1.963*** -1.750*** -1.726*** -1.846*** -1.230*** -1.923*** 
 (0.276) (0.263) (0.263) (0.277) (0.403) (0.278) 
Firm Age 0.466*** 0.503*** 0.524*** 0.448*** 0.374*** 0.474*** 
 (0.0363) (0.0355) (0.0376) (0.0324) (0.0673) (0.0343) 
BC -0.285*** -0.294*** -0.278*** -0.282*** -0.239 -0.307*** 
 (0.0953) (0.0975) (0.0969) (0.0969) (0.167) (0.0974) 
Industry GM 1.920*** 1.689*** 1.688*** 1.835*** 2.118*** 1.713*** 
 (0.141) (0.134) (0.134) (0.143) (0.244) (0.142) 
Log Medowner -0.171***      
 (0.0133)      
G-Index  0.0365***     
  (0.00772)     
E-Index   0.0838***    
   (0.0155)    
% Indep Directors    1.209***   
    (0.123)   
Outside Blocks     0.00411**  
     (0.00165)  
CEO-Chair Duality      0.210*** 
      (0.0359) 
Constant -3.351*** -5.991*** -5.944*** -6.236*** -5.018*** -5.458*** 
 (0.289) (0.354) (0.348) (0.327) (0.473) (0.292) 
       
Observations 6,392 7,326 7,326 6,545 2,664 6,545 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 9 - Heckman 2nd Stage: Governance and Pension Plan Assets Per Employee 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pension Assets Per 
Employee 
Pension Assets Per 
Employee 
Pension Assets Per 
Employee 
Pension Assets Per 
Employee 
Pension Assets Per 
Employee 
Pension Assets Per 
Employee 
       
Log Sales 0.0358 0.0572** 0.0785*** 0.0565*** 0.00370 0.0102 
 (0.0252) (0.0236) (0.0242) (0.0201) (0.0400) (0.0231) 
Sales Growth -0.387*** -0.408*** -0.405*** -0.500*** -0.848*** -0.496*** 
 (0.115) (0.0923) (0.0911) (0.0947) (0.181) (0.108) 
Market Return 0.391*** 0.387*** 0.386*** 0.366*** 1.172*** 0.369*** 
 (0.118) (0.0965) (0.0951) (0.0974) (0.242) (0.111) 
Leverage -0.483*** -0.224* -0.176 -0.178 -0.526** -0.414*** 
 (0.159) (0.115) (0.114) (0.134) (0.257) (0.148) 
Tobin’s Q 0.195*** 0.114*** 0.108*** 0.134*** 0.177*** 0.172*** 
 (0.0314) (0.0259) (0.0257) (0.0268) (0.0554) (0.0296) 
Unionization 4.064*** 4.461*** 4.549*** 4.558*** 3.190*** 4.233*** 
 (0.268) (0.219) (0.216) (0.223) (0.495) (0.253) 
ROA -3.633*** -3.515*** -3.511*** -3.641*** -3.590*** -3.727*** 
 (0.354) (0.290) (0.289) (0.302) (0.598) (0.331) 
Firm Age 0.115** 0.236*** 0.254*** 0.209*** -0.149 0.151*** 
 (0.0472) (0.0390) (0.0410) (0.0350) (0.103) (0.0413) 
BC 0.271** 0.125 0.0997 0.206** 0.305 0.271** 
 (0.125) (0.106) (0.105) (0.105) (0.254) (0.118) 
Industry GM 0.822*** 0.947*** 0.963*** 0.897*** 0.642* 0.705*** 
 (0.189) (0.148) (0.146) (0.156) (0.387) (0.176) 
Log Medowner -0.112***      
 (0.0177)      
G-Index  -0.0162*     
  (0.00855)     
E-Index   0.0170    
   (0.0170)    
% Indep Directors    0.999***   
    (0.134)   
Outside Blocks     0.000349  
     (0.00258)  
CEO-Chair Duality      0.0277 
      (0.0438) 
Constant 3.898*** 1.803*** 1.309*** 0.984*** 3.876*** 2.507*** 
 (0.378) (0.392) (0.384) (0.359) (0.728) (0.351) 
       
Observations 6,335 7,261 7,261 6,487 2,630 6,487 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 10 - Heckman 2nd Stage: Governance and Growth in Pension Plan Assets 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pension Assets 
Growth 
Pension Assets 
Growth 
Pension Assets 
Growth 
Pension Assets 
Growth 
Pension Assets 
Growth 
Pension Assets 
Growth 
       
Log Sales -0.00374 -0.00250 -0.00323 -0.00247 0.00589 -0.00331 
 (0.00295) (0.00321) (0.00333) (0.00280) (0.00490) (0.00289) 
Sales Growth 0.214*** 0.221*** 0.221*** 0.220*** 0.160*** 0.220*** 
 (0.0133) (0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0132) (0.0222) (0.0133) 
Market Return 0.0919*** 0.0693*** 0.0694*** 0.0965*** 0.459*** 0.0962*** 
 (0.0136) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0136) (0.0297) (0.0137) 
Leverage -0.0546*** -0.0305* -0.0309** -0.0612*** -0.0855*** -0.0611*** 
 (0.0186) (0.0157) (0.0157) (0.0187) (0.0325) (0.0184) 
Tobin’s Q 0.000884 0.00112 0.00105 0.00366 0.00155 0.00407 
 (0.00382) (0.00367) (0.00366) (0.00383) (0.00725) (0.00384) 
Unionization -0.109*** -0.0682** -0.0686** -0.114*** -0.0198 -0.118*** 
 (0.0310) (0.0296) (0.0296) (0.0310) (0.0601) (0.0312) 
ROA 0.0266 0.0215 0.0184 0.0229 0.101 0.0242 
 (0.0431) (0.0406) (0.0406) (0.0429) (0.0776) (0.0430) 
Firm Age -0.0267*** -0.0330*** -0.0356*** -0.0273*** -0.0351*** -0.0288*** 
 (0.00560) (0.00539) (0.00571) (0.00492) (0.0132) (0.00525) 
BC 0.0606*** 0.0534*** 0.0526*** 0.0601*** -0.0192 0.0613*** 
 (0.0146) (0.0145) (0.0145) (0.0146) (0.0326) (0.0148) 
Industry GM 0.00721 0.0526*** 0.0527*** 0.0127 0.0156 0.0110 
 (0.0217) (0.0200) (0.0200) (0.0216) (0.0470) (0.0216) 
Log Medowner 0.00756***      
 (0.00205)      
G-Index  -0.00325***     
  (0.00116)     
E-Index   -0.00671***    
   (0.00233)    
% Indep Directors    -0.0128   
    (0.0189)   
Outside Blocks     0.000217  
     (0.000321)  
CEO-Chair Duality      0.00209 
      (0.00548) 
Constant 0.0937** 0.214*** 0.214*** 0.191*** 0.0589 0.194*** 
 (0.0446) (0.0534) (0.0526) (0.0501) (0.0908) (0.0446) 
       
Observations 6,336 7,258 7,258 6,484 2,619 6,484 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 11 - Heckman 2nd Stage: Governance and Pension Liabilities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pension Liabilities Pension Liabilities Pension Liabilities Pension Liabilities Pension Liabilities Pension Liabilities 
       
Log Sales 1.037*** 1.032*** 1.039*** 1.009*** 1.028*** 1.000*** 
 (0.0176) (0.0199) (0.0207) (0.0168) (0.0244) (0.0173) 
Sales Growth 0.160** 0.170** 0.169** 0.0467 0.0189 0.0345 
 (0.0790) (0.0777) (0.0776) (0.0787) (0.108) (0.0788) 
Market Return -0.0763 -0.0623 -0.0633 -0.0996 -0.0362 -0.0961 
 (0.0811) (0.0810) (0.0810) (0.0811) (0.146) (0.0812) 
Leverage 0.0864 0.172* 0.183* 0.276** -0.326** 0.178 
 (0.109) (0.0955) (0.0955) (0.110) (0.159) (0.108) 
Tobin’s Q 0.137*** 0.0708*** 0.0740*** 0.0918*** 0.0616* 0.102*** 
 (0.0229) (0.0221) (0.0220) (0.0230) (0.0358) (0.0231) 
Unionization 3.630*** 3.876*** 3.871*** 3.996*** 4.074*** 3.874*** 
 (0.185) (0.183) (0.183) (0.186) (0.304) (0.186) 
ROA -2.097*** -1.746*** -1.720*** -1.993*** -1.461*** -2.053*** 
 (0.254) (0.241) (0.241) (0.252) (0.380) (0.254) 
Firm Age 0.390*** 0.424*** 0.447*** 0.369*** 0.288*** 0.390*** 
 (0.0341) (0.0334) (0.0356) (0.0300) (0.0654) (0.0319) 
BC -0.233*** -0.252*** -0.237*** -0.218** -0.198 -0.235*** 
 (0.0882) (0.0897) (0.0893) (0.0883) (0.160) (0.0892) 
Industry GM 1.484*** 1.323*** 1.323*** 1.436*** 1.710*** 1.291*** 
 (0.130) (0.123) (0.123) (0.129) (0.234) (0.129) 
Log Medowner -0.141***      
 (0.0122)      
G-Index  0.0338***     
  (0.00720)     
E-Index   0.0821***    
   (0.0144)    
% Indep Directors    1.248***   
    (0.112)   
Outside Blocks     0.00415***  
     (0.00156)  
CEO-Chair Duality      0.203*** 
      (0.0324) 
Constant -2.928*** -5.191*** -5.199*** -5.449*** -4.399*** -4.594*** 
 (0.268) (0.333) (0.328) (0.304) (0.459) (0.272) 
       
Observations 6,579 7,511 7,511 6,739 2,692 6,739 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 12 - Heckman 2nd Stage: Governance and Pension Liabilities Per Employee 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pension Liabilities 
Per Employee 
Pension Liabilities 
Per Employee 
Pension Liabilities 
Per Employee 
Pension Liabilities 
Per Employee 
Pension Liabilities 
Per Employee 
Pension Liabilities 
Per Employee 
       
Log Sales 0.00169 0.0410* 0.0643*** 0.0255 -0.00865 -0.0227 
 (0.0340) (0.0230) (0.0235) (0.0199) (0.0452) (0.0324) 
Sales Growth -0.382** -0.396*** -0.393*** -0.478*** -0.847*** -0.472*** 
 (0.157) (0.0908) (0.0889) (0.0960) (0.203) (0.152) 
Market Return 0.0343 0.0543 0.0541 0.0102 0.499* 0.0133 
 (0.160) (0.0948) (0.0926) (0.0986) (0.274) (0.156) 
Leverage -0.271 0.0309 0.0794 -0.0373 -0.451 -0.267 
 (0.212) (0.111) (0.109) (0.132) (0.289) (0.205) 
Tobin’s Q 0.243*** 0.134*** 0.127*** 0.184*** 0.229*** 0.227*** 
 (0.0431) (0.0253) (0.0249) (0.0267) (0.0626) (0.0422) 
Unionization 3.564*** 4.001*** 4.101*** 4.041*** 2.745*** 3.670*** 
 (0.365) (0.215) (0.211) (0.225) (0.566) (0.357) 
ROA -3.896*** -3.537*** -3.521*** -3.927*** -3.856*** -4.007*** 
 (0.477) (0.275) (0.273) (0.293) (0.669) (0.463) 
Firm Age 0.0207 0.161*** 0.183*** 0.118*** -0.246** 0.0529 
 (0.0650) (0.0384) (0.0404) (0.0353) (0.118) (0.0590) 
BC 0.326* 0.140 0.116 0.268** 0.353 0.344** 
 (0.170) (0.104) (0.102) (0.105) (0.288) (0.167) 
Industry GM 0.379 0.599*** 0.621*** 0.501*** 0.262 0.275 
 (0.258) (0.145) (0.142) (0.158) (0.438) (0.248) 
Log Medowner -0.0798***      
 (0.0240)      
G-Index  -0.0149*     
  (0.00843)     
E-Index   0.0261    
   (0.0165)    
% Indep Directors    1.052***   
    (0.133)   
Outside Blocks     0.000258  
     (0.00290)  
CEO-Chair Duality      0.0298 
      (0.0613) 
Constant 4.421*** 2.451*** 1.910*** 1.858*** 4.558*** 3.478*** 
 (0.515) (0.383) (0.375) (0.354) (0.834) (0.498) 
       
Observations 6,520 7,444 7,444 6,679 2,656 6,679 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 13 - Heckman 2nd Stage: Governance and Growth in Pension Liabilities  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pension Liabilities 
Growth 
Pension Liabilities 
Growth 
Pension Liabilities 
Growth 
Pension Liabilities 
Growth 
Pension Liabilities 
Growth 
Pension Liabilities 
Growth 
       
Log Sales -0.00121 -0.000957 -0.00152 -0.000842 0.0102** -0.000856 
 (0.00252) (0.00282) (0.00293) (0.00242) (0.00516) (0.00248) 
Sales Growth 0.180*** 0.193*** 0.193*** 0.187*** 0.179*** 0.187*** 
 (0.0114) (0.0110) (0.0110) (0.0114) (0.0233) (0.0113) 
Market Return -0.198*** -0.194*** -0.194*** -0.198*** -0.0339 -0.198*** 
 (0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0115) (0.0117) (0.0315) (0.0116) 
Leverage 0.0100 0.00505 0.00424 0.00122 -0.0294 0.00477 
 (0.0156) (0.0136) (0.0136) (0.0159) (0.0341) (0.0156) 
Tobin’s Q 0.00163 0.000882 0.000790 0.00336 0.00240 0.00291 
 (0.00333) (0.00323) (0.00322) (0.00337) (0.00765) (0.00336) 
Unionization -0.0623** -0.0421 -0.0426 -0.0664** -0.00797 -0.0649** 
 (0.0265) (0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0268) (0.0640) (0.0268) 
ROA 0.0328 0.0830** 0.0814** 0.0417 0.0860 0.0449 
 (0.0369) (0.0349) (0.0350) (0.0370) (0.0814) (0.0369) 
Firm Age -0.0134*** -0.0199*** -0.0215*** -0.0182*** -0.0243* -0.0182*** 
 (0.00487) (0.00477) (0.00508) (0.00431) (0.0141) (0.00457) 
BC 0.0438*** 0.0402*** 0.0397*** 0.0410*** -0.0496 0.0410*** 
 (0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0347) (0.0128) 
Industry GM 0.00647 0.0287* 0.0286 0.00661 0.0239 0.00790 
 (0.0186) (0.0174) (0.0174) (0.0186) (0.0498) (0.0184) 
Log Medowner 0.00463***      
 (0.00176)      
G-Index  -0.00184*     
  (0.00102)     
E-Index   -0.00468**    
   (0.00205)    
% Indep Directors    -0.0262   
    (0.0163)   
Outside Blocks     0.000111  
     (0.000337)  
CEO-Chair Duality      0.00411 
      (0.00465) 
Constant 0.0650* 0.151*** 0.155*** 0.160*** 0.0892 0.136*** 
 (0.0384) (0.0474) (0.0467) (0.0440) (0.0969) (0.0389) 
       
Observations 6,512 7,430 7,430 6,668 2,638 6,668 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 14 – Governance and Funded Status Volatility 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Funded Status 
Volatility 
Funded Status 
Volatility 
Funded Status 
Volatility 
Funded Status 
Volatility 
Funded Status 
Volatility 
Funded Status 
Volatility 
       
Log Sales -0.00106 -0.00520*** -0.00589*** -0.00156 0.00159 -0.00167 
 (0.00147) (0.00162) (0.00169) (0.00139) (0.00230) (0.00143) 
Sales Growth 0.00901 0.00457 0.00481 0.00705 0.0413*** 0.00682 
 (0.00663) (0.00632) (0.00638) (0.00651) (0.0102) (0.00651) 
Market Return -0.00608 -0.00478 -0.00493 -0.00759 -0.0467*** -0.00769 
 (0.00681) (0.00660) (0.00667) (0.00671) (0.0138) (0.00671) 
Leverage 0.0213** 0.0170** 0.0150* 0.0248*** 0.0360** 0.0254*** 
 (0.00915) (0.00779) (0.00785) (0.00913) (0.0150) (0.00896) 
Tobin’s Q -0.00581*** -0.00461** -0.00441** -0.00615*** -0.00889*** -0.00623*** 
 (0.00193) (0.00180) (0.00181) (0.00191) (0.00334) (0.00191) 
Unionization 0.0282* 0.0142 0.0105 0.0358** -0.0293 0.0351** 
 (0.0155) (0.0149) (0.0150) (0.0153) (0.0287) (0.0153) 
ROA 0.0379* 0.0290 0.0318 0.0377* 0.114*** 0.0383* 
 (0.0214) (0.0197) (0.0198) (0.0211) (0.0356) (0.0211) 
Firm Age 0.0169*** 0.0113*** 0.0121*** 0.0184*** 0.0180*** 0.0185*** 
 (0.00288) (0.00274) (0.00293) (0.00250) (0.00611) (0.00265) 
BC -0.00820 -0.00367 -0.00242 -0.00778 -0.00336 -0.00799 
 (0.00739) (0.00730) (0.00734) (0.00732) (0.0152) (0.00737) 
Industry GM -0.0204* -0.0382*** -0.0396*** -0.0216** -0.0768*** -0.0226** 
 (0.0109) (0.0100) (0.0101) (0.0107) (0.0221) (0.0106) 
Log Medowner -0.00277***      
 (0.00103)      
G-Index  0.00228***     
  (0.000587)     
E-Index   0.000946    
   (0.00119)    
% Indep Directors    0.00116   
    (0.00931)   
Outside Blocks     -0.000631***  
     (0.000148)  
CEO-Chair Duality      0.00397 
      (0.00268) 
Constant 0.172*** 0.180*** 0.205*** 0.132*** 0.130*** 0.130*** 
 (0.0225) (0.0271) (0.0269) (0.0253) (0.0430) (0.0224) 
       
Observations 6,566 7,493 7,493 6,724 2,682 6,724 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 15 – Heckman 2nd Stage: Governance and lower discount rates (below median) used to discount pension liabilities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Low Disc Low Disc Low Disc Low Disc Low Disc Low Disc 
       
Log Sales -0.00980 -0.00762 -0.00406 -0.00617 -0.00489 -0.00482 
 (0.00811) (0.00896) (0.00928) (0.00763) (0.00327) (0.00795) 
Sales Growth 0.251*** 0.234*** 0.234*** 0.276*** -0.00316 0.277*** 
 (0.0373) (0.0355) (0.0354) (0.0368) (0.0145) (0.0372) 
Market Return 0.647*** 0.661*** 0.661*** 0.638*** -0.0379* 0.641*** 
 (0.0380) (0.0369) (0.0367) (0.0377) (0.0206) (0.0381) 
Leverage -0.0937* -0.0364 -0.0275 -0.124** 0.00342 -0.140*** 
 (0.0512) (0.0436) (0.0435) (0.0514) (0.0217) (0.0510) 
Tobin’s Q 0.0158 0.0289*** 0.0278*** 0.0257** 0.0152*** 0.0280** 
 (0.0111) (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.0111) (0.00534) (0.0112) 
Unionization -0.408*** -0.483*** -0.470*** -0.531*** -0.0900** -0.545*** 
 (0.0855) (0.0824) (0.0820) (0.0851) (0.0413) (0.0861) 
ROA -0.434*** -0.671*** -0.670*** -0.412*** -0.0479 -0.432*** 
 (0.120) (0.111) (0.111) (0.118) (0.0515) (0.119) 
Firm Age 0.00507 -0.0138 -0.0111 -0.00515 -0.00420 0.00213 
 (0.0162) (0.0155) (0.0165) (0.0140) (0.00911) (0.0151) 
BC 0.0117 -0.00161 -0.00510 0.0338 0.0120 0.0253 
 (0.0415) (0.0411) (0.0407) (0.0412) (0.0229) (0.0419) 
Industry GM -0.0330 0.0468 0.0495 0.0301 -0.0148 0.00696 
 (0.0599) (0.0552) (0.0550) (0.0591) (0.0311) (0.0593) 
Log Medowner 0.0483***      
 (0.00574)      
G-Index  -0.00300     
  (0.00332)     
E-Index   0.00490    
   (0.00661)    
% Indep Directors    0.272***   
    (0.0539)   
Outside Blocks     0.000377*  
     (0.000212)  
CEO-Chair Duality      0.0102 
      (0.0152) 
Constant -0.0431 0.673*** 0.584*** 0.400*** 0.0773 0.567*** 
 (0.125) (0.151) (0.149) (0.140) (0.0622) (0.124) 
       
Observations 6,223 7,152 7,152 6,372 2,428 6,372 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 16 – Heckman 2nd Stage: Governance and higher rates of return (above median) used to smooth pension returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Excess ROR Excess ROR Excess ROR Excess ROR Excess ROR Excess ROR 
       
Log Sales 0.0630*** 0.0567*** 0.0540*** 0.0495*** 0.0480*** 0.0488*** 
 (0.00889) (0.00946) (0.00972) (0.00828) (0.0114) (0.00865) 
Sales Growth -0.0876** -0.0932** -0.0946** -0.127*** 0.128** -0.131*** 
 (0.0414) (0.0381) (0.0377) (0.0403) (0.0516) (0.0408) 
Market Return -0.203*** -0.187*** -0.187*** -0.201*** 0.0907 -0.203*** 
 (0.0422) (0.0397) (0.0393) (0.0413) (0.0736) (0.0418) 
Leverage 0.274*** 0.212*** 0.203*** 0.295*** 0.144* 0.304*** 
 (0.0569) (0.0466) (0.0463) (0.0566) (0.0766) (0.0562) 
Tobin’s Q -0.0187 -0.0298*** -0.0272** -0.0283** -0.0339* -0.0303*** 
 (0.0118) (0.0108) (0.0107) (0.0117) (0.0189) (0.0118) 
Unionization 0.726*** 0.849*** 0.828*** 0.861*** 0.475*** 0.863*** 
 (0.0946) (0.0885) (0.0876) (0.0929) (0.144) (0.0943) 
ROA 0.279** 0.477*** 0.485*** 0.312** 0.492*** 0.314** 
 (0.129) (0.115) (0.115) (0.127) (0.186) (0.128) 
Firm Age 0.0721*** 0.0904*** 0.0935*** 0.0538*** 0.0575* 0.0579*** 
 (0.0174) (0.0161) (0.0170) (0.0149) (0.0320) (0.0161) 
BC -0.0122 -0.000708 0.00897 -0.0292 0.00750 -0.0352 
 (0.0458) (0.0445) (0.0439) (0.0451) (0.0833) (0.0459) 
Industry GM 0.332*** 0.195*** 0.190*** 0.277*** 0.466*** 0.269*** 
 (0.0663) (0.0596) (0.0590) (0.0647) (0.111) (0.0651) 
Log Medowner -0.0604***      
 (0.00636)      
G-Index  0.0144***     
  (0.00348)     
E-Index   0.0213***    
   (0.00691)    
% Indep Directors    0.00790   
    (0.0583)   
Outside Blocks     0.00143*  
     (0.000764)  
CEO-Chair Duality      0.0634*** 
      (0.0167) 
Constant 0.149 -0.787*** -0.674*** -0.469*** -0.166 -0.522*** 
 (0.135) (0.157) (0.154) (0.149) (0.216) (0.133) 
       
Observations 6,040 6,962 6,962 6,184 2,379 6,184 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 17 – Probit regression detailing likelihood of having a “Well Funded” (above median) pension plan 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  
VARIABLES Well Funded Well Funded Well Funded Well Funded Well Funded Well Funded  
        
Log Sales 0.183*** 0.191*** 0.197*** 0.168*** 0.214*** 0.166***  
 (0.0128) (0.0114) (0.0114) (0.0124) (0.0221) (0.0125)  
Sales Growth -0.112 -0.0510 -0.0514 -0.167* 0.262* -0.173*  
 (0.0923) (0.0827) (0.0829) (0.0903) (0.137) (0.0903)  
Market Return 1.046*** 0.952*** 0.953*** 1.038*** 1.548*** 1.038***  
 (0.0945) (0.0891) (0.0891) (0.0929) (0.169) (0.0929)  
Leverage -0.0915 -0.106 -0.104 -0.0237 -0.0266 -0.0395  
 (0.115) (0.0966) (0.0966) (0.112) (0.177) (0.112)  
Tobin’s Q -0.0563*** -0.0759*** -0.0737*** -0.0734*** -0.227*** -0.0726***  
 (0.0213) (0.0183) (0.0183) (0.0204) (0.0323) (0.0206)  
Employee Productivity 0.0386* 0.0320 0.0273 0.0316 0.0923** 0.0391*  
 (0.0220) (0.0205) (0.0205) (0.0220) (0.0419) (0.0218)  
Unionization 1.593*** 1.547*** 1.547*** 1.815*** 2.549*** 1.774***  
 (0.209) (0.190) (0.190) (0.203) (0.321) (0.204)  
ROA 0.138 0.610*** 0.634*** 0.204 0.576 0.199  
 (0.250) (0.206) (0.207) (0.241) (0.393) (0.242)  
Firm Age 0.267*** 0.292*** 0.320*** 0.240*** 0.508*** 0.247***  
 (0.0266) (0.0246) (0.0240) (0.0253) (0.0449) (0.0251)  
Industry GM 1.187*** 0.939*** 0.934*** 1.124*** 1.651*** 1.090***  
 (0.146) (0.134) (0.134) (0.143) (0.268) (0.144)  
BC -0.256*** -0.292*** -0.276*** -0.278*** -0.250 -0.287***  
 (0.0921) (0.0928) (0.0925) (0.0916) (0.170) (0.0918)  
Log Medowner -0.0855***       
 (0.0133)       
G-Index  0.0383***      
  (0.00594)      
E-Index   0.0795***     
   (0.0119)     
% Indep Directors    0.266***    
    (0.0966)    
Outside Blocks     -0.00136   
     (0.00194)   
CEO-Chair Duality      0.0837**  
      (0.0343)  
Constant -2.143*** -3.706*** -3.608*** -3.172*** -4.864*** -3.127***  
 (0.324) (0.267) (0.266) (0.279) (0.558) (0.278)  
        
Observations 6,579 7,511 7,511 6,739 2,692 6,739  
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 18 – Heckman 2nd Stage: Governance and Well Funded (above median) status 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Well Funded Well Funded Well Funded Well Funded Well Funded Well Funded 
       
Log Sales 0.0520*** 0.0626*** 0.0636*** 0.0530*** 0.0178* 0.0496*** 
 (0.00780) (0.00879) (0.00910) (0.00744) (0.00919) (0.00762) 
Sales Growth -0.0449 -0.0284 -0.0290 -0.0675* 0.0492 -0.0688** 
 (0.0350) (0.0343) (0.0343) (0.0348) (0.0407) (0.0347) 
Market Return 0.443*** 0.428*** 0.428*** 0.446*** 0.848*** 0.446*** 
 (0.0359) (0.0358) (0.0358) (0.0359) (0.0549) (0.0357) 
Leverage -0.108** -0.0720* -0.0713* -0.0638 -0.112* -0.0734 
 (0.0483) (0.0421) (0.0421) (0.0488) (0.0597) (0.0477) 
Tobins Q -0.00976 -0.0242** -0.0229** -0.0183* -0.0399*** -0.0163 
 (0.0101) (0.00974) (0.00971) (0.0102) (0.0135) (0.0102) 
Unionization 0.574*** 0.627*** 0.621*** 0.684*** 0.309*** 0.664*** 
 (0.0818) (0.0810) (0.0809) (0.0823) (0.115) (0.0821) 
ROA 0.0648 0.232** 0.240** 0.0570 0.199 0.0540 
 (0.113) (0.106) (0.106) (0.112) (0.143) (0.112) 
Firm Age 0.0767*** 0.107*** 0.114*** 0.0822*** 0.0405* 0.0787*** 
 (0.0151) (0.0147) (0.0157) (0.0133) (0.0246) (0.0141) 
BC -0.0628 -0.0972** -0.0915** -0.0828** -0.0240 -0.0786** 
 (0.0390) (0.0396) (0.0394) (0.0391) (0.0601) (0.0393) 
Industry GM 0.421*** 0.396*** 0.396*** 0.413*** 0.378*** 0.401*** 
 (0.0575) (0.0544) (0.0543) (0.0573) (0.0880) (0.0567) 
Log Medowner -0.0295***      
 (0.00542)      
G-Index  0.0117***     
  (0.00318)     
E-Index   0.0246***    
   (0.00634)    
% Indep Directors    0.0264   
    (0.0495)   
Outside Blocks     -0.000951  
     (0.000589)  
CEO-Chair Duality      0.0197 
      (0.0143) 
Constant 0.101 -0.649*** -0.624*** -0.361*** 0.349** -0.304** 
 (0.119) (0.147) (0.145) (0.135) (0.172) (0.120) 
       
Observations 6,579 7,511 7,511 6,739 2,692 6,739 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 19 – Heckman 1st Stage: Probit regression detailing likelihood of sponsoring DB plan with MTR 
variable 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
VARIABLES Pen Pen Pen Pen Pen Pen 
       
Log Sales 0.285*** 0.314*** 0.326*** 0.262*** 0.257*** 0.266*** 
 (0.0246) (0.0208) (0.0211) (0.0236) (0.0295) (0.0235) 
Sales Growth -0.0814 -0.0980 -0.120 -0.153 0.0773 -0.158 
 (0.152) (0.133) (0.133) (0.150) (0.180) (0.149) 
Market Return -0.162 -0.154 -0.154 -0.176 -0.888*** -0.190 
 (0.153) (0.139) (0.138) (0.149) (0.216) (0.148) 
Leverage 0.747*** 0.437*** 0.409*** 0.872*** 0.549** 0.811*** 
 (0.192) (0.150) (0.150) (0.183) (0.214) (0.189) 
Tobin’s Q -0.0948*** -0.103*** -0.103*** -0.120*** -0.191*** -0.119*** 
 (0.0276) (0.0227) (0.0229) (0.0258) (0.0344) (0.0263) 
Employee Productivity 0.271*** 0.179*** 0.171*** 0.224*** 0.227*** 0.255*** 
 (0.0393) (0.0350) (0.0350) (0.0395) (0.0543) (0.0388) 
Unionization 1.647*** 2.377*** 2.281*** 1.968*** 2.466*** 1.833*** 
 (0.387) (0.351) (0.357) (0.373) (0.431) (0.373) 
ROA -0.0685 0.0360 0.0132 0.0646 0.833* 0.0672 
 (0.342) (0.247) (0.252) (0.336) (0.450) (0.341) 
Firm Age 0.356*** 0.351*** 0.421*** 0.304*** 0.705*** 0.328*** 
 (0.0378) (0.0346) (0.0338) (0.0352) (0.0539) (0.0345) 
Industry GM 0.925*** 0.530** 0.568** 0.967*** 0.0668 0.870*** 
 (0.287) (0.257) (0.257) (0.283) (0.374) (0.284) 
BC -0.671*** -0.670*** -0.605*** -0.701*** -0.414** -0.679*** 
 (0.128) (0.135) (0.130) (0.125) (0.198) (0.128) 
MTR 0.858*** 0.898*** 0.912*** 0.880*** 0.191 0.844*** 
 (0.179) (0.161) (0.160) (0.177) (0.241) (0.175) 
Log Medowner -0.111***      
 (0.0219)      
G-Index  0.0919***     
  (0.00936)     
E-Index   0.158***    
   (0.0194)    
% Indep Directors    1.065***   
    (0.143)   
Outside Blocks     0.00477*  
     (0.00253)  
CEO-Chair Duality      0.0413 
      (0.0537) 
Constant -4.601*** -6.020*** -5.733*** -5.940*** -6.321*** -5.682*** 
 (0.577) (0.445) (0.445) (0.497) (0.722) (0.494) 
       
Observations 4,425 4,935 4,935 4,537 2,186 4,537 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 20 – Heckman 2nd Stage: Governance and DB Plan management including MTR variable 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Funded Status Pension Assets 
Growth 
Pension Liabs 
Growth 
Pension Assets Pension Liabilities Pension Assets Per 
Employee 
Pension Liabs Per 
Employee 
        
Log Sales 0.0311*** -1.58e-05 0.000481 1.071*** 1.030*** 0.0734*** 0.0544* 
 (0.00523) (0.00313) (0.00275) (0.0220) (0.0197) (0.0251) (0.0287) 
Sales Growth -0.0114 0.189*** 0.162*** 0.205* 0.238** -0.341*** -0.327** 
 (0.0257) (0.0154) (0.0135) (0.108) (0.0972) (0.124) (0.143) 
Market Return 0.375*** 0.130*** -0.204*** 0.339*** -0.0480 0.508*** 0.119 
 (0.0266) (0.0158) (0.0139) (0.111) (0.100) (0.128) (0.147) 
Leverage 0.0393 -0.0717*** 0.0174 -0.280* -0.0274 -0.417** -0.146 
 (0.0376) (0.0228) (0.0196) (0.160) (0.141) (0.180) (0.202) 
Tobin’s Q -0.0117* -0.00348 -0.00118 0.100*** 0.129*** 0.169*** 0.204*** 
 (0.00678) (0.00404) (0.00359) (0.0281) (0.0256) (0.0311) (0.0359) 
Unionization 0.424*** -0.102*** -0.0729** 4.161*** 3.492*** 4.176*** 3.584*** 
 (0.0586) (0.0349) (0.0309) (0.245) (0.222) (0.281) (0.325) 
ROA 0.392*** 0.0469 0.112** -1.502*** -1.749*** -3.109*** -3.479*** 
 (0.0857) (0.0519) (0.0453) (0.360) (0.322) (0.393) (0.444) 
Firm Age 0.0317*** -0.0163*** -0.00951* 0.424*** 0.350*** 0.166*** 0.0983* 
 (0.0106) (0.00615) (0.00546) (0.0435) (0.0397) (0.0487) (0.0564) 
BC -0.00493 0.0600*** 0.0428*** -0.280** -0.152 0.311** 0.463*** 
 (0.0308) (0.0180) (0.0162) (0.127) (0.117) (0.141) (0.165) 
Industry GM 0.121** -0.0158 -0.0295 1.805*** 1.329*** 0.633** 0.223 
 (0.0517) (0.0307) (0.0271) (0.216) (0.195) (0.248) (0.286) 
Log Medowner -0.0303*** 0.00612** 0.00395* -0.186*** -0.151*** -0.130*** -0.0998*** 
 (0.00406) (0.00241) (0.00213) (0.0169) (0.0153) (0.0194) (0.0223) 
MTR 0.174*** 0.0242 0.0305* 0.263* -0.00963 0.411** 0.168 
 (0.0348) (0.0207) (0.0183) (0.146) (0.131) (0.166) (0.191) 
Constant 0.709*** 0.0373 0.0410 -3.062*** -2.508*** 3.504*** 3.877*** 
 (0.0809) (0.0481) (0.0425) (0.339) (0.307) (0.383) (0.441) 
        
Observations 4,400 4,271 4,380 4,306 4,425 4,271 4,389 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 21 – 1st Stage Heckman: Result of pension choice with CEO Characteristics 
 (1) (2) (3) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Pen Pen Pen Pen Pen Pen Pen 
        
Log Sales 0.188*** 0.354*** 0.203*** 0.249*** 0.255*** 0.275*** 0.234*** 
 (0.0229) (0.0502) (0.0247) (0.0219) (0.0350) (0.0208) (0.0365) 
Sales Growth -0.177 -0.273 -0.189 -0.169 -0.255 -0.161 -0.368 
 (0.136) (0.307) (0.137) (0.136) (0.223) (0.135) (0.227) 
Market Return 0.0441 0.253 0.0502 0.0169 0.00846 0.0109 0.00746 
 (0.128) (0.230) (0.127) (0.127) (0.179) (0.127) (0.180) 
Leverage 0.412*** -0.0812 0.429*** 0.464*** 0.0350 0.503*** 0.0549 
 (0.160) (0.262) (0.160) (0.159) (0.209) (0.159) (0.211) 
Tobin’s Q -0.0967*** -0.124** -0.111*** -0.0945*** -0.141*** -0.0751*** -0.127*** 
 (0.0265) (0.0542) (0.0277) (0.0270) (0.0413) (0.0272) (0.0423) 
Employee Productivity 0.206*** 0.212*** 0.195*** 0.199*** 0.137*** 0.212*** 0.109** 
 (0.0333) (0.0636) (0.0330) (0.0329) (0.0493) (0.0329) (0.0502) 
Unionization 1.788*** 1.528** 1.798*** 1.749*** 2.246*** 1.671*** 2.432*** 
 (0.342) (0.637) (0.345) (0.343) (0.521) (0.339) (0.525) 
ROA -0.343 0.869 -0.282 -0.372 0.587 -0.484 0.131 
 (0.364) (0.672) (0.372) (0.366) (0.517) (0.370) (0.533) 
Firm Age 0.347*** 0.382*** 0.366*** 0.361*** 0.452*** 0.348*** 0.454*** 
 (0.0307) (0.0622) (0.0307) (0.0307) (0.0486) (0.0304) (0.0489) 
BC -0.450*** -0.285 -0.489*** -0.516*** -0.605*** -0.531*** -0.609*** 
 (0.102) (0.261) (0.102) (0.102) (0.165) (0.103) (0.165) 
Industry GM 0.803*** 0.894*** 0.862*** 0.953*** 1.019*** 0.984*** 1.042*** 
 (0.207) (0.318) (0.207) (0.207) (0.280) (0.207) (0.285) 
Log Medowner -0.0956*** -0.0504 -0.0971*** -0.0933*** -0.0836*** -0.0936*** -0.0934*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0342) (0.0184) (0.0184) (0.0262) (0.0184) (0.0266) 
Log CEO Salary 0.405***       
 (0.0468)       
Log Shares (Value)  -0.129***      
  (0.0270)      
Log Total Comp   0.155***     
   (0.0290)     
% Salary of Total Comp    -0.404***   -0.410*** 
    (0.104)   (0.154) 
CEO Ownership     -0.0303***  -0.0268*** 
     (0.00409)  (0.00441) 
% Bonus      0.360** 0.680*** 
      (0.144) (0.219) 
Constant -5.535*** -3.962*** -4.196*** -3.324*** -3.125*** -3.847*** -2.493*** 
 (0.523) (0.957) (0.490) (0.493) (0.716) (0.476) (0.754) 
        
Observations 6,213 1,424 6,198 6,198 2,217 6,198 2,203 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 22 – Heckman 2nd Stage: CEO Characteristics and pension plan funded status  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
VARIABLES Funded Status Funded Status Funded Status Funded Status Funded Status Funded Status Funded Status 
        
Log Sales 0.0481*** 0.0302* 0.0477*** 0.0386*** 0.0458*** 0.0359*** 0.0392*** 
 (0.00422) (0.0171) (0.00466) (0.00462) (0.0117) (0.00470) (0.0104) 
Sales Growth 0.000304 -0.127** 0.00105 -0.00248 -0.0902* -0.00402 -0.0705 
 (0.0220) (0.0585) (0.0221) (0.0222) (0.0461) (0.0221) (0.0443) 
Market Return 0.317*** 0.251*** 0.316*** 0.319*** 0.229*** 0.321*** 0.235*** 
 (0.0222) (0.0526) (0.0221) (0.0221) (0.0431) (0.0221) (0.0404) 
Leverage -0.0756** 0.0375 -0.0800*** -0.0835*** 0.0525 -0.0849*** 0.0412 
 (0.0298) (0.0641) (0.0300) (0.0302) (0.0542) (0.0303) (0.0512) 
Tobin’s Q -0.00967 -0.0602*** -0.00858 -0.0106* -0.0497*** -0.0136** -0.0406*** 
 (0.00607) (0.0184) (0.00623) (0.00614) (0.0151) (0.00604) (0.0144) 
Unionization 0.474*** 0.225* 0.481*** 0.479*** 0.596*** 0.492*** 0.492*** 
 (0.0524) (0.132) (0.0529) (0.0530) (0.127) (0.0525) (0.122) 
ROA 0.107 0.476*** 0.0969 0.114 0.362** 0.128* 0.381*** 
 (0.0710) (0.182) (0.0708) (0.0710) (0.143) (0.0718) (0.137) 
Firm Age 0.0309*** 0.0867*** 0.0315*** 0.0302*** 0.0721*** 0.0327*** 0.0500** 
 (0.00889) (0.0221) (0.00936) (0.00942) (0.0227) (0.00920) (0.0213) 
BC -0.0199 -0.0959 -0.0209 -0.0187 -0.0565 -0.0209 -0.0328 
 (0.0235) (0.0705) (0.0236) (0.0238) (0.0549) (0.0238) (0.0519) 
Industry GM 0.345*** 0.233*** 0.344*** 0.327*** 0.406*** 0.329*** 0.369*** 
 (0.0355) (0.0849) (0.0358) (0.0363) (0.0796) (0.0364) (0.0740) 
Log Medowner -0.0237*** -0.00603 -0.0231*** -0.0233*** -0.0214*** -0.0239*** -0.0160** 
 (0.00346) (0.00777) (0.00347) (0.00346) (0.00699) (0.00344) (0.00683) 
Log CEO Salary -0.0640***       
 (0.0119)       
Log Shares (Value)  -0.00383      
  (0.00798)      
Log Total Comp   -0.0236***     
   (0.00568)     
% Salary    0.0565***   0.0543 
    (0.0218)   (0.0411) 
CEO Ownership      -0.00152  -0.000459 
     (0.00189)  (0.00171) 
% Bonus      -0.0483* -0.120** 
      (0.0247) (0.0522) 
Constant 0.938*** 0.260 0.700*** 0.583*** 0.242 0.628*** 0.340** 
 (0.105) (0.183) (0.0812) (0.0723) (0.167) (0.0736) (0.148) 
Observations 6,181 1,417 6,171 6,171 2,204 6,171 2,192 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
